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Chapter One: Emerson, Montaigne, and the Philosophical Relevance of Literature  
 
 
According to Judith Shklar (1990, 611) not only is Montaigne Emerson’s hero, but 
Emerson is the American thinker in whom one finds the greatest understanding and appreciation 
of Montaigne’s Essays (see also Shklar 1989). The kinship between Montaigne and Emerson 
extends beyond the latter’s appreciation of the former. Both essayists address the topics of 
skepticism and the relationship between skepticism and how one ought to live. In doing so, both 
Emerson and Montaigne speak to the philosophical importance of literature and how one should 
understand the relationship between literature and philosophy. 
Emerson lays out his understanding of skepticism by presenting Montaigne as the “wise” 
skeptic (Emerson 1910, 7). Emerson asks one to consider if “we [shall] say that Montaigne has 
spoken wisely and given the right and permanent expression of the human mind on the conduct 
of life” (Emerson 1910, 7). The question of how one ought to live is central to both Emerson and 
Montaigne. In particular, Emerson uses Montaigne to raise the question of how one should 
understand the relationship between the skepticism embodied by Montaigne and how one ought 
to live. In turn, he asks his readers to consider the relationship between [wise] skepticism and the 
proper conduct of their own life. As for how one is to go about answering this question, Emerson 
follows the example of Montaigne and points to the essay and the art of essaying.  
As an American essayist writing within the transcendental movement that permeated 
intellectual life in the nineteenth century, Emerson chooses to essay his thoughts for the purpose 
of creating his own, nonconformist view of the world. His purpose for writing, is parallel to 
Montaigne’s.  Neither Montaigne nor Emerson writes to persuade their audience about objective 
 3 
truth; rather they essay to create their personal understandings of their own experiences and, in 
turn, to understand themselves as individuals better than they once had.  
The assessment of the relationship between the thought of Montaigne and Emerson 
makes clear that both writers have the goal of increasing the likelihood of human and social 
reform. This common concern speaks to the inherent philosophic quality of both authors. 
According to scholar, Lee Trepanier (2020, 5), “From an initial position of censorship and 
subordination to a revival of equal status, to philosophical reason, literature has been viewed by 
modern and postmodern philosophers as being more in touch with reality than the ‘artificiality,’ 
of science” and by doing so it can “point to ways to reorganize society in a more just and 
humane way.” While a single act of essaying clearly cannot bring about reform in society, the act 
has the ability to bring about reform to the soul and ultimately change the ways in which one 
thinks.  Self-knowledge, to both essayists, lays the framework for human reform and bettering 
human nature’s world view.1 In order to achieve this betterment, skepticism is a requirement for 
 
1 Human nature inevitably focuses on external matters, contributing to man’s lacking, “unity, and 
lies broken in heaps,” to him being “disunited with himself” (Barkalow 2014, 137). Emerson 
looks to Montaigne’s work as a guide on how man can become reunited with himself by looking 
inward. While modern reformists aim to better the external matters of the society we live in, it is 
clear that “Emerson is critical of the nature of their reform as they miss the proper object of 
genuine reform—the individual soul” (Barkalow 2014, 138). Emerson calls for education as the 
means for which human reform is possible, however, when diverging opinions and conformity 
become apparent in a learning environment, “this consequence of skepticism contributes to the 
breakdown of man. It becomes possible to combat this when one recognizes that “what we do 
not call education is more precious than what we call education” (Barkalow 2014, 139). The 
education that Emerson invokes is a type of moral education, where skepticism can be 
thoughtfully and appropriately exercised, which speaks to Montaigne’s influence on Emerson. 
Reading Montaigne through an Emersonian perspective, allows the reader to take into 
consideration how these texts influence the way in which we perceive the world. Essaying 
provides one with the educational value that Emerson speaks so highly of, in hopes of creating a 




a good essayist to perform his/her work properly. An understanding of Emerson’s view of the 
relationship between the essay and skepticism in Montaigne provides one with a testable 
hypothesis for a reading of Montaigne’s Essays and for understanding the relationship between 
the essay and skepticism/philosophy more generally.    
Emerson provides insight into his understanding of the relationship between skepticism 
and how one ought to live in his account of human nature as a penny. He contends that humans 
are composed of two natures resembling that of a coin toss and that “Life is a pinching of 
this penny--heads or tails” (Emerson 1910, 3). Each face of the coin is part of the whole, which 
to Emerson reflects the human being. Emerson writes that the individual,   
never tire[s] of this game, because there is still a slight shudder of astonishment at the 
exhibition of the other face, at the contrast of the two faces…Each man is born with a 
predisposition to one of the other of these sides of nature; and it will easily happen that 
men will be found devoted to one or the other (Emerson 1910, 3). 
    
Emerson’s concern that people will devote themselves to one side of the coin and not the other 
suggests that Emerson is concerned by the lack of harmony that characterizes 
the human condition. For Emerson, human nature is composed of two sides—the nihilist on one 
end and the dogmatist on the other. Whereas the nihilist may believe there is no truth, and the 
dogmatist holds a strict belief that one on their side holds truth, Emerson argues that neither 
thinks properly and, consequently, cannot live properly. According to Emerson, only the 
“wise” skeptic is able to live properly—by neither accepting nor rejecting, but instead 
questioning each position to form his/her own view.2  Although there will always be converging 
 
2 Emerson’s “wise” skepticism can be viewed as an alternative to the skepticism he associates 
with David Hume. Robert Richardson (1995) argues that Emerson follows key Scottish thinkers 
(Adam Smith, Thomas Brown, Thomas Reid, and especially Dugald Stewart) in struggling with 
Hume’s perceived extreme skepticism. Worried that Hume’s skepticism leads to nihilism, 
Emerson and these Scottish thinkers employ the concept of the moral sense as a source of human 
 5 
and diverging direction in which human thought can go, Emerson attempts to reconcile these 
concerns through a form of “wise” skepticism and the act of essaying—holding Montaigne in 
high regard on the matter. Moreover, while reading Emerson, it is understood that the thought 
embodied by the skeptic, is not the thought process that individuals may entirely want, but the 
one human nature needs in order to live happily and construct a realistic philosophical 
view of life.     
On what this skeptical philosophic view looks like, Emerson contends that the “right 
ground of the skeptic” is one that is “of considerations, of self-containing; not at all of unbelief; 
not at all of universal denying, nor of universal doubting, --doubting event that he doubts; least 
of all, of scoffing and profligate jeering at all that is stable and good” (Emerson 1910, 4).  The 
skeptic does not, therefore, identify himself with any strict perception of the world; he does not 
follow any specific dogma, nor does he disbelieve of any truth—he simply admits to not 
knowing and allows himself to ask what he can and cannot know. In his Essays, especially 
the Apology for Raymond Sebond, Montaigne grapples with the question of how one ought to 
live. Similar to the dichotomy between the nihilist and the dogmatist that Emerson 
presents, Montaigne presents the dichotomy of the particular and the universal; i.e. to refer to the 
particular is to refer to the experiences that human have access to, whereas the universal 
experience, otherwise known as the “general,” is experiences that are simply meant for the 
divine, and not for human nature.3 While one cannot experience the universal/general, essaying 
 
meaning (see Von Cromphout 1999, 17). For an alternative view suggesting that Emerson’s and 
Hume actually have quite a bit in common see Buell (2003) and Dolan (2009). 
3 In Montaigne’s essay entitled, Of Prayers, he writes, “I may be wrong, I do not know; but since 
by a particular favor of divine goodness a certain form of prayer has been prescribed and dictated 
to us word for word by the mouth of God, it has always seemed to me that its use should be more 
ordinary with us than it is” (Montaigne 1958, 229).  In this essay, Montaigne critiques how the 
individual feels as though they have a connection to God through speaking prayers out loud.  
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can bring us closer to the general through an analysis of our particular experiences. For instance, 
Montaigne seems to write about various, even random, topics in a single essay—encompassing 
his thoughts towards a particular experience or thought on other’s experiences. Through the act 
of essaying, Montaigne brings balance to the two sides of Emerson’s “coin” i.e., when writing, 
the individual is able to find what experiences have in common with one another, and by the end 
of this reflection, one may recognize that one may have been wrong about the latent, 
general concept. Essaying allows Montaigne to question and to come to terms with the world by 
exercising his skepticism in a healthy way that improves his own life.  Emerson recognizes this 
possibility when he writes, “The abstractionist and the materialist thus mutually exasperating 
each other, and the scoffer expressing the worst of materialism” whereas, the skeptic, “finds both 
wrong by being in extremes” (Emerson 1910, 3). In rejecting the extremes of nihilism and 
dogmatism, Emerson finds in the skepticism of Montaigne the philosophy man needs in order to 
lead a happy life. In order to achieve this, man must thoughtfully question his own experiences 
and what they mean in a skeptical manner. Given the problem of particular experience and its 
consequences for understanding anything outside of our own experience, it seems to that the only 
path to knowledge, no matter how limited, lies within each person and the key to this has to be 
the essay. 
Recognition of this way of thinking is the fundamental reason for why Emerson holds 
Montaigne out as the representative skeptic. He writes, “But though we are natural conservers 
 
Further, he writes of how, “We pray out of habit and custom or to speak more correctly, we read 
or pronounce our prayers.  All in all, it is only an act” (Montaigne 1958, 231).  Montaigne 
critiques the particular’s relationship to the universal and how pointless our outward attempts to 
become one with the universal are.  Fundamentally, Montaigne lends credence to the act of 
essaying, i.e., by turning ourselves inward, whether it is prayer or essaying, we cannot gain full 
access to the Divine, but we can gain a limited sense of it through knowing our worth and 
purpose as individuals.   
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and causationists, and reject a sour, dumpish unbelief, the skeptical class, which Montaigne 
represents, have reason, and every man, at some time belongs to it” (Emerson 
1910, 8). Emerson’s use of “every man” in this passage is important because it allows one to 
connect this to the title of his text, Representative Man. The various examples provided in the 
text represent different aspects or qualities of all humans. In this sense, they are representative, 
and Emerson’s emphasis on representation speaks to an underlying democratic sensibility. Thus, 
when looking at his public speaking, the creation of The Dial, and his choice to write 
predominantly in the essay format, one is presented with evidence suggesting that for Emerson 
and possibly other essayists there is a connection between the essay, as a mode of writing, and 
larger, democratic principles of political theory.4 
This is not to say, however, that an understanding of Montaigne is the same thing as 
an understanding of Emerson and vice versa. Montaigne and Emerson differ in their views 
toward faith, yet both recognize that faith plays a role in placing limits on skepticism and 
protection from extreme lines of thought. While Montaigne does not believe that we are ever 
going to reach an understanding the Divine fully, as living individuals who practice religious 
beliefs, Emerson attributes himself to a more robust sense of religion—that of the moral 
sense.5 Emerson believes that the individual can gain more access to the Divine through our 
experience and our intuitive sense of right and wrong. In contrast, Montaigne would reject the 
idea of the moral sense as a constituent element of human self-understanding. Alan Levine 
 
4 This possibility is further warranted by the fact that both Emerson and Montaigne address key 
concepts of political theory in their work. Emerson, for example, speaks to the nature of equality 
and the evil of slavery in his Anti-Slavery writings while Montaigne is long recognized as one of 
the key figures on the topic of religious toleration. 
 
5 The moral sense can be understood as a moral faculty that serves as a source of moral authority. 
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discusses Montaigne’s use of “self-knowledge,” and while some truths are out of our earthly 
grasp, he claims that Montaigne recognizes “that human beings can possess the essence of moral 
truth and that they cannot know anything at all” (Levine 2001, 5). Emerson, as a later essayist, 
does more than simply uncover what Montaigne invokes within his essays.6 Emerson’s reliance 
on the moral sense in addition to his skepticism changes how one should think about skepticism. 
By marrying the moral sense to skepticism, Emerson suggests that skepticism by itself is not 
capable of providing moral evaluations. In contrast, Montaigne’s reliance on skepticism alone 
suggests that inherent to his understanding of skepticism is a moral quality. Alan Levine speaks 
to this in his account of Montaigne’s moral skepticism. According to Levine, the moral skeptic 
assumes a more tolerant viewpoint than other by “being able to give a non-transcendent reason 
why one should not follow one’s will wherever it may take one” (Levine 2001, 15). What 
differentiates Emerson from Montaigne is the former’s reliance on something transcendent (the 
moral sense) to give meaning to life whereas the latter recovers the ancient (Platonic) 
understanding of moral skepticism (see Levine 2001, 145-50).7 For Montaigne and the ancients, 
morality and skepticism are intertwined and cannot be divorced. Consequently, the act of 
 
6 Before his collection of essays, Montaigne writes in his note, To the Reader, that within his 
book, “[he] has set [himself] no goal but a domestic and private one” without a thought of, 
“serving you (the reader) or [his] own glory” (Montaigne 1958, 2). This note written in 1580, 
was produced after he had written the essays in his collection. He recognizes that his purpose 
was not to appease the public with his work, but to write with the intention of uncovering who he 
is as an individual. Through essaying, his moral sense becomes restored, as he recognizes that 
although his thoughts may not be in the, “world’s favor,” his turning inward allows him to find 
fulfillment in what he observes through the particular.  
 
7 According to this view, the Socratic word for inquiry (Skepsis) requires one to question an 
argument’s logical connections and relations to the world of the most comprehensive questions 
regarding human experience (see Plato Gorgias 487e & Laws 636d; Xenophon Oeconomicus vi 
13). 
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essaying is itself a moral act. As such, essaying would seem to serve a fundamentally 
philosophic purpose. 
On the Relationship between Literature and Philosophy 
Taking up the relationship between literature and philosophy, Martha Nussbaum argues 
that it is necessary to bring literature back into the philosophic fold by showing that the novel 
provides philosophic insights not available to traditional philosophic treatises. She concludes the 
opening of Love’s Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (1990, 3) with the following 
observation: “Literary form is not separable from philosophical content, but is, itself, a part of 
content—an integral part, then, of the search for and the statement of truth.” In advancing this 
thesis, Nussbaum seeks to recover the ancient sensibility that philosophy and literature engaged 
in a common enterprise. Based on her reading of the tension between philosophy and the poets 
found in Plato’s Republic and her interpretation of Aristotle’s Poetics, Nussbaum maintains that 
philosophers and poets (broadly understood) were engaged in a common “educational and 
communicative activity” focused on improving the human soul (Nussbaum 1990, 16). Lee 
Trepanier (2020, 8) characterizes Nussbaum’s objective in terms of the ability of literature to 
help “citizens develop the capacity for sympathy and empathy for others, leading to values of 
solidarity and tolerance with are required for democratic self-governance.” In order to recover 
and develop these building blocks of democratic governance, Nussbaum reminds her reader that 
it is necessary to understand the central place of form to larger, ethical questions.  
 In order to recapture this understanding, Nussbaum points to ancient philosophy. The 
ancients, in Nussbaum’s reading, believed that “some of the most interesting and urgent 
questions about literary form itself could not be well pursued unless one asked about the intimate 
connections between formal structures and the content they express” (Nussbaum 1990, 22). 
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Thus, Aristotle places greater importance on poetry than history. He writes: “For this reason too 
poetry is a more philosophical and more serious thing than history, since poetry speaks more of 
things that are universal, and history things that are particular. It is what is universal, the sorts of 
things that a certain sort of person turns out to say or do as a result of what is likely or necessary 
that poetry aims at” (Poetics, 1451b 5-10). Accordingly, poetry and other forms of literature 
speak to the nature of universal things because they have the effect of transporting the reader 
from one’s “confined and . . . parochial” experience to one where the reader must reflect and feel 
“what might otherwise be too distant a feeling” (Nussbaum 1990, 47). Nussbaum’s primary 
objective in writing Love’s Knowledge is to bring literature back into the philosophic fold, but in 
doing so she points to a large number of future research projects.8 
While Nussbaum’s argument for the philosophical value of the novel is persuasive, her 
argument is limited to the novel. She does not take up the philosophic value of other literary 
forms. This thesis extends Nussbaum’s argument for the philosophic value of literature by 
looking at a literary form not considered by Nussbaum—the essay. The essay, as a literary form, 
originates with Montaigne (1533-1592). The word “essay” comes from the French word essayer 
meaning “to attempt” or “to try” (Levine 2001, 26). Unlike a philosophic treatise, or even a 
novel, the essay is meant to serve as a way to confront truths, allowing the reader and writer of 
the essay to have their own perspective (Levine 2011, 228). By placing these perspectives in 
dialectic opposition, Montaigne “provokes introspection” on the part of the reader by forcing the 
reader to consider their position on certain questions and the reasons for why one holds a 
particular position (Levine 2001, 5). To the extent that essaying has the effect of returning 
 
8 See also Nussbaum 2000; and for a complimentary, but slightly different perspective see Booth 
1988. 
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readers to their selves, Montaigne’s fundamental philosophic contribution can be said to consist 
of his idea “of an evanescent self”; that is, a conception of the self that that is forever evolving 
and changing points of views and decisions (Levine 2011, 251). In his understanding of a self 
that perpetually evolves and changes, Montaigne provides his reader with insight into his second 
philosophic contribution—skepticism.  
At the heart of this project is a concern with the relationship between the essay and 
philosophy. To get at this relationship, an initial focus of Montaigne’s understanding of the 
relationship between the essay and skepticism is necessary. The centrality of this relationship has 
already been suggested by the account of Emerson’s Montaigne as the representative skeptic in 
Representative Man. Primarily, what will be discussed in greater detail is the manner and extent 
to which the essay and the act of essaying facilitate the philosophically important goal of 
developing a healthy form of skepticism that avoids the extremes of nihilism and dogmatism. As 
such, to a considerable degree, this project builds on the research of Levine (2001 and 2011). 
According to Levine (2001, 2), Montaigne finds the primary source of intolerance in the 
“unruliness of or imbalance” of the human mind. My concern with the extremes of nihilism and 
dogmatism raises the possibility that these are the primary sources of the “unruliness” and 
“imbalance.” To get at Montaigne’s understanding of these relationships, the second chapter of 
this thesis provides a close textual reading of Montaigne’s longest essay, The Apology for 
Raymond Sebond. The Apology presents Montaigne’s most comprehensive account of the limits 
of human reason (Fontana 2008, 12). Thus, in beginning my study with the Apology, I am able to 
establish Montaigne’s skeptical foundation. This is important because the key to reading and 
interpreting the “moral and political” program of a skeptic like Montaigne is to find his starting 
point, or the thing he does “not doubt” (Levine 2011, 251). Equipped with this understanding, I 
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test for the presence of Montaigne’s skeptical foundation in his account of faith. The possibility 
of testing in this way is suggested by Fontana (2008, 12), who contends that when one is able to 
connect the Apology to the “variety of social and ethical issues” found in Montaigne’s other 
essays, one gains insight into his “eminently practical scope.” In other words, by testing the 
relationship between Montaigne’s skepticism and what he says on other topics one is provided 
with a clear sense of his understanding of the relationship between philosophy or ethics on the 
one hand and particular literary form, the essay, on the other.  
Montaigne’s Essays present a unique interpretive challenge. In large measure, the 
challenge is a consequence of the fact that the Essays appears to lack unity (Levine 2011, 228-
229). Montaigne’s style presents one with another set of issues. Rejecting the conventional 
seriousness of philosophic expression, Montaigne’s writing is “freewheeling, unsystematic, 
irreverent, and fun. In short, it is likely that many ‘serious’ scholars have ignored him for 
precisely the reasons he has been loved by his readers” (Levine 2001 26). Combining these two 
sets of difficulties, the response of Montaigne’s contemporaries to his Essays is instructive. 
According to Fontana (2008, 3), they harbored “the uneasy feeling that the writer’s real intention 
eluded them, thus promoting the tenacious legend of his ambiguity and duplicity” (see also 
Gauna 1989). If correct, what is needed when interpreting Montaigne is a methodological 
approach that allows one to come to terms with his esoteric or hidden teaching.  
Such an approach is provided by Leo Strauss in Persecution and the Art of Writing 
(1988). Strauss’ method requires three things from the reader: 1) that they suspend all personal 
judgment, 2) only understand terms and phrases as the author defines them, and 3) do not rely on 
external information to understand the primary text. In addition, students employing the 
Straussian method should grasp the difference between an author’s exoteric (direct) and esoteric 
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(indirect) meaning and understand why philosophers sometimes choose to write covertly (see 
also Melzer 2014). Strauss believes an indirect dialogue affords the author a few things: 
protection from persecution, a way to express knowledge without exposing it as opinion, and an 
access to students interested in philosophical education. For Strauss, philosophical education is 
not about forcing students one way or the other but guiding them toward the truth step-by-step. 
This approach to reading Montaigne is suggested by Levine (2011, 230) who, in speaking to the 
dialectic quality of Montaigne’s Essays, contends that Montaigne aims “to initiate a reflective 
thought process in the reader, with the latter [the reader] being what proves the claim of the 
former [the text].”  
Where Levine’s account of the philosophic importance of the essay is understood in the 
shadow of Nietzsche and his challenge for the justification of moral preferences, this project 
considers the implication of Montaigne’s understanding of the philosophic importance of the 
essay in a different direction. In particular, I contrast Montaigne’s understandings of the essay as 
a means of generating a healthy form of skepticism as a necessary condition for reforming the 
self with the understanding(s) of the essay’s philosophic importance as understood by Sir Francis 
Bacon. The first step in this direction is to determine the nature of Montaigne’s understanding of 









Chapter Two: Montaigne on Skepticism, Faith, and the Purpose of the Essay 
 
 
 Montaigne began writing his Essays in 1572, and over the twenty years leading up to his 
death managed to write three books, collectively making up about one thousand pages. 
Addressing various topics, the Essays are characterized by a lack of organization. There seems to 
be no rhyme or reason to the ordering of the essays and the essays themselves can be 
characterized by their lack of organization.  Montaigne often shifts his perspective within the 
same essay leading him to contradict what was previously said in the same essay as well what 
was said in a previous essay. In the twenty years Montaigne devoted to writing his essays, he 
never actually removed anything he had written. He only made additions to what was contained. 
In doing so, Montaigne is able to develop his thought by laying out all of the permutations his 
thinking goes through on a particular topic. Thus, it really cannot be said that Montaigne’s 
Essays are inconsistent or random as the purpose of essaying for Montaigne focuses on the 
development of the self. As argued in thus chapter, key to accomplishing this task is the 
development of the appropriate, or to use Emerson’s phrase a “wise” skepticism.  
Montaigne provides his understanding of skepticism in his Apology for Raymond Sebond 
(hereafter Apology). In his Apology, Montaigne develops a humanistic approach towards 
Christianity.9 He recognizes the absolute importance of the "divine and miraculous 
metamorphosis," brought about through a devout faith in the Divine. At the same time, 
 
9 Humanism is the set of philosophic principles relating to the improvement of the human 
condition on earth. A humanist is one who does not merely base an argument solely from the 
revelations from a supernatural source, but one who aids in the progression of human 
understanding on earth. Montaigne questions the value of the opinion’s individuals acquire and 
offers his solution in how to improve the intolerance permeated his own life in 16th century 
Europe. Within Montaigne’s Politics: Authority and Governance in the Essais, Biancamaria 
Fontana defines Montaigne’s character as “humanistic” (Fontana 2008, 2).   
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Montaigne is able to ascertain the flaws of all believers, and non-believers. Both, according to 
Montaigne, adhere to the opposite of God’s intended image; an intolerant, and opinionated world 
(Montaigne 1958, 457). Not only is Montaigne writing during a time of religious tensions 
between Catholics and Protestants, but he is also writing at the time where religious thinkers, like 
Sebond, are attacked by advocates of science and philosophy on the grounds that only through 
the application of reason is knowledge possible, and thereafter, human happiness and the 
perfection of man. Through a defense of Sebond against two primary criticisms, Montaigne 
seeks to reveal the true foundation of Christianity while at the same time revealing the limits of 
human understanding. It is necessary, first, to identify Montaigne’s thoughts on reason. As 
indicated in the previous chapter, the key to interpreting a skeptic like Montaigne is identifying 
what he does not doubt. This allows one to test for the role played by Montaigne’s skepticism in 
other essays and on other topics. Here, the focus is on Montaigne’s understanding of faith as an 
understanding of the relationship between knowledge and faith should reveal Montaigne’s 
thoughts on human nature. This, in turn, provides one with insight into Montaigne’s thoughts on 
the limitations and possibilities of human life and his reply to the philosophic question of how 
one ought to live. Montaigne’s skepticism extends beyond the self and informs his argument for 
religious tolerance. Thus, while the essay and essaying primarily serve the purpose of self-
cultivation, Montaigne indicates that one of the consequences of essaying is that better self-
understanding may potentially serve a larger, social good.     
 In order to grasp a full understanding of Montaigne’s skepticism, the first part of this 
chapter lays out Montaigne’s understanding of reason, knowledge, and faith. Throughout the 
Apology, it is clear that Montaigne does not denounce a particular way of thinking as wrong, but 
merely points out where they are inconsistent with other ways of thinking. He does this by 
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expressing their incorrectness—mainly within their own self-knowledge. For instance, he speaks 
of the atheist who “by the reason of their judgement, that what is said about hell and future 
punishments is fiction. But when the chance to test this is offered as old age or illnesses bring 
them near death, the terror of it fills them with a new belief through horror at their coming 
condition” (Montaigne 1958, 325). Here, while Montaigne does not reject atheism, he is clear 
that the atheist’s lack of faith has the effect of disregarding a complete acknowledgement of 
one’s true self, which Montaigne believes should be held in high regard. The second section of 
the chapter assesses Montaigne’s understanding of the relationship between these concepts while 
the third section considers the implication of these relationships for Montaigne’s views on 
human nature. Cumulatively, these two sections provide how Montaigne takes a skeptical 
position regarding human nature and our capacity for knowledge. As shown in the final two 
sections, this skepticism informs both Montaigne’s argument for religious toleration and his 
understanding of how the act of essaying fosters both self-understanding and tolerance. 
Montaigne’s Defense of Sebond 
At the beginning of the Apology, Montaigne levels each argument made against Sebond’s 
Natural Theology, within his “Defense” of each. He begins with the first criticism made against 
Sebond which is, “Christians do themselves harm in trying to support their belief by human 
reasons, since it is conceived only by faith and by a particular inspiration of divine grace” 
(Montaigne 1958, 321). Here, Montaigne is critical of those who try to place the foundation of 
Christianity on both faith and reason. Like Sebond, Montaigne holds the position that faith alone 
is the true foundation of Christianity and while there is merit in bringing reason to bear on 
religious matters, the value lies not in what reason reveals about religion, but in what religion 
reveals about the limits of human reason. In his defense, Montaigne contends that “faith alone 
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embraces vividly and surely the high mysteries of our religion,” but that this way of thinking is, 
“not a very fine and laudable enterprise” to rely on (Montaigne 1958, 321). Human nature is 
made in God’s image; therefore, Montaigne believes it to be inevitable that we are always bound 
to use reason as a “human tool” (Montaigne 1958, 321). To understand faith is to question and 
interpret Scripture in one’s own way. Montaigne’s analysis of the first criticism aligns with a 
relativist approach, i.e., applying reason to spiritual belief is dependent on the reader’s 
interpretation. According to Montaigne, it is possible, within limits, for an individual to apply 
reason in search of truth.  However, in accepting the limits of reason and human knowledge, the 
individual must overcome certain aspects of human nature, especially human vanity.10  
Montaigne also warns that while we should accompany our faith with reason, we must 
also have the “reservation, not to think that it is on us that faith depends, or that our efforts and 
arguments can attain a knowledge so supernatural and divine” (Montaigne 1958, 322). Despite 
being a Christian himself, Montaigne rejects the practice of other Christians during this time who 
“accord to piety only the services that flatter [their] passions” and who, consequently, are bound 
to the confines of “hostility . . . avarice and rebellion” when they should, according to their 
dogma, be filled with “goodness and moderation” (Montaigne 1958, 324). It is clear that while 
Montaigne remains a devout Catholic, he rejects the hostile nature between the Protestant and 
 
10 Montaigne describes vanity from St. Augustine’s perspective, who defines it as a “mental for. . 
. weighing down the soul, while the earthly tabernacle oppresses the much pondering mind” 
(Montaigne 1958, 330). In other words, vanity oppresses the mind to see what is true, and as a 
result, pride may “cast man aside from the common ways, that makes him embrace novelties and 
prefer to be the leader of an erring troop that has strayed from the path of perdition” (Montaigne 
1958, 368). In short, human nature is ultimately corrupted in how we perceive ourselves. Our 
vanity and pride distances us from truth and exceed our ability to reason properly. A fuller 
treatment of the negative consequences of vanity and their implication for human understanding 
is provided below. Further, the discussion of essaying speaks to how one might employ essaying 
to combat these problems. 
 18 
Catholic sects of Christianity and calls for reform in those who apply reason to spiritual matters. 
While it is in God’s image to do so, human nature applies reason beyond its limits and, with that 
being said, an interpretation of religion becomes dogma where it should be purely individualistic.  
Montaigne’s perceives knowledge as only possessing truth when perfected by God. In his 
second defense of Sebond, against the criticism of those who say that Sebond’s argument is 
“weak and unfit to prove what he proposes,” Montaigne becomes skeptical, not of Sebond’s 
arguments, but of those who refute his arguments and believe they are correct (Montaigne 1958, 
327). He writes of how people are “prone to apply the meaning of other men’s writings to suit 
opinions they have previously determined in their minds” (Montaigne 1958, 327).  In other 
words, people interpret works, especially the Bible, not in light of what the works themselves say 
or reveal, but in light of the ideas and opinions we already have. People impose meaning on texts 
and this not only leads to misinterpretation, but more importantly for Montaigne, explains why 
religion has strayed from its proper foundations. One sees this in Montaigne’s thoughts on the 
relationship between the individual and the Bible. Whereas the Bible instructs one to believe he 
or she is created to live within God’s image, Montaigne is skeptical of human nature’s ability to 
do so.11  To Montaigne, the ability to reason is inherent within human nature, yet when limits are 
not placed on our ability to do so, human nature becomes unhappy, corrupt, and at war. Human 
vanity, for instance, is what corrupts man’s sense of knowledge. Montaigne employs this idea in 
the section, “Man is No Better than Animals,” where he argues that it is due to human vanity that 
we perceive humankind as having dominance over animals. Given human nature’s innate 
capacity to reason, it is by our vanity, “that man equals himself to God, attributes himself to 
 
11 “So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female 
he created them.” (Genesis 1:27). 
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divine characteristics, picks himself out and separates himself from the horde of other creatures” 
(Montaigne 1958, 331). In theory he believes that animals should have “superiority” over 
humans, as he describes man as “one of the most vulnerable and frail of all creatures” 
(Montaigne 1958, 330 & 333). According to Montaigne, the current state of nature is a result of 
man’s incorrectness, equating his reason to the truths that only the Divine has access to. While 
humans are apt to reason for themselves, Montaigne’s skepticism on human nature is informed 
when human nature promotes their reason too far and subsequently furthers one’s pride in 
believing they are capable of all knowledge. Not only do we set ourselves apart from God’s 
creatures, but we liken ourselves to God, in thinking we are more powerful than a beast. In 
holding the position that man is superior to animals, man inverts what the Bible teaches about the 
fallen man, and imperfect in the image of God. Consequently, man begins to view himself in 
Divine terms, and rather than being created in God’s image, man begins to create God in his own 
image. Vanity does not allow one to exercise true judgement but allows one to make assumptions 
on what is true out of pride, and without reasoning. Moreover, it is human nature that corrupts 
itself by misusing the gift reason to heighten its capacity to having higher powers over beasts. 
More importantly, man does something similar to those who do not share the same opinion as he 
does.   
In his defense of Sebond, Montaigne expresses his perspective as a skeptic to those who 
refute Sebond and dogmatic theology itself.  As a skeptic, he essays to seek an inward solution to 
the problems he assesses within the Church and within those who may find their opinions to 
matter more than others.  Recognizing man’s inability to live out what the Bible teaches, he 
suggests that vanity is at the root of the problems occurring during the time of the Reformation.  
In the next section of this chapter, an evaluation of Montaigne’s place in philosophy is crucial to 
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how the act of essaying plays a crucial role in his defense of Sebond. By laying out the issues he 
finds within human nature, Montaigne begins to come to terms with how he can provide counsel 
to those living through the Protestant Reformation and bring about tolerance through the 
judgement that those like Sebond are confronted with.  
Montaigne’s Critique of Philosophy 
 In addition to his defense of Sebond, Montaigne dismantles the thought process of those 
who claim they are most knowledgeable and most apt to critique Sebond: philosophers.   Within 
the section entitled, “Man’s Knowledge Cannot Make Him Happy,” Montaigne points to 
ignorance, as opposed to knowledge, as the foundation of happiness. Although he suggests that 
learning is, “necessary for life,” he contends that, “a greater number of excellent men will be 
found among the ignorant than among the learned” (Montaigne 19548, 359). When one accepts 
ignorance as an inherent human characteristic, Montaigne believes that we consequently acquire 
tranquility through simplicity—simple happiness and pursued knowledge that we accumulate 
living a humble, tolerant life. Most philosophers, according to Montaigne, are incorrect given 
their reason in forming their arguments on life is informed by their memories. He writes, quoting 
Euripides, “philosophy gives to keep in our memory only past happiness, and to efface from it 
the troubles we have suffered; as if the science of forgetfulness were in our power,” and views 
this as problematic to human knowledge, given that “memory sets before us, not what we 
choose, but what it pleases” (Montaigne 1958, 365). To Montaigne, the fundamental problem 
with philosophy, and philosophic dogma for that matter, has to do with philosophers writing out 
of experience and memories. Not having any practical idea of what is to come out of the 
“irresolution, uncertainty, grief, superstition, . . . war, falsehood, disloyalty, detraction, and 
curiosity” that will occur within the world; the philosopher’s passions become stirred, without 
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actually proving any truth on what is to come (Montaigne 1958, 358). Instead of informing one’s 
reason, as they aim to do, philosophers undermine one’s self-knowledge in order to conform with 
a specific philosophic theory. Further, the philosopher, with the exception of Socrates, vainly 
assumes that experience and knowledge is universal. Montaigne’s primary limitation on human 
reason is recognizing that reason is not likely to be universal in nature because the foundation of 
knowledge and individual experience cannot be generalized. Neither is it the case that one 
actually has a firm grasp of an experience given the fact that one’s senses can be deceived. 
Consistent with the ideals of enlightenment philosophy, Montaigne emphasizes that in order to 
live happily, one must accept the unknown for what it is. Those who cannot accept this have “so 
much propensity to madness” and shift into “sickness of thought” (Montaigne 1958, 363).   
Despite his skepticism, Montaigne’s foundation for thinking relies on faith as the basis 
for improving the human condition. In order to have faith in God, one must accept ignorance as 
an inherent quality of human nature; i.e. accepting that no one has the answers to certain 
complex, spiritual and philosophical concepts.12 All one can know about God is present in His 
Word, and His first law suggesting “pure obedience; it was a naked and simple commandment 
about which man had nothing to know or discuss” (Montaigne 1958, 359). The first temptation, 
by the devil, according to Genesis 3:5, was “For God knows that when you eat of [the fruit in the 
garden] your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil;” and since 
this notion is proven false by the events that follow within the Bible it is evident that “ignorance 
is so recommended by our religion as quality suitable for belief and religion” (Montaigne 1958, 
360).  Here, the following passages indicate that philosophers of Montaigne’s time apply reason 
incorrectly, where the Bible is actually straightforward in what it requires.  Montaigne presumes 
 
12 Some of these concepts may include a definition of who God is, which religion is correct, etc. 
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that acceptance of one’s ignorance is a requirement for one to maintain their faith, while 
considering reason as appropriate and consistent with the teaching of Christianity when limited 
to our position within God’s creation. In “The Senses are Inadequate,” Montaigne gives the 
example of the blind man, “understanding so little what he lacks, that he uses and employs as we 
do words appropriate to sight and applies them in a manner all private and his own” (Montaigne 
1958, 445). Here, Montaigne contends that human nature’s senses and perceptions lead one to 
believe something to be true. The senses do not facilitate knowledge, but lack of them helps one 
judge and perceive something in a different way from one who can make use of all the senses.   
Both the Old and New Testaments contain stories that facilitate one’s understanding of 
the relationship between the soul and the self. Reading Scripture affords the faithful a sense of 
solace as they may find in the text and understanding of how the Word of God applies to their 
own situation. Consistent with the lessons contained within the Bible, faith often sheds light on 
those who are struck with physical blindness as those who will gain insight from God, and 
different than the average individual (Psalm 146:8). The blind man is not deceived from 
experience, but he judges by character and virtue. Knowledge is derived within the blind man 
himself, as opposed to his senses or opinions he conforms to and accepts his ignorance of being 
unable to see in order to form an enlightened vision of the individual based on morality. 
Montaigne suggests that the virtue of the blind man is both consistent with Christianity and 
identifies human nature’s innate ability to reason through their senses as having a corruptive 
aspect to knowledge, i.e., not containing any truth for the blind man, as he perceives life 
differently than the average individual. Montaigne believes that there is truth, however, only 
through the Divine can it be perfected and proven to be true. Given that the senses are the 
“masters of [one’s] knowledge; they are uncertain and deceivable in all circumstances. It is there 
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that we must fight it out…using stubbornness, heedlessness and impudence” (Montaigne 1958, 
447). Seeking to correct human nature’s approach to knowledge, Montaigne calls for self-
introspection to battle the outward passions that govern aspects of our life through religious and 
philosophic dogma.   
To understand Montaigne’s concern with dogmatism it is helpful to consider the context 
in which he was writing. In particular, it is necessary to consider the suffering caused by the 
battle between Catholics and Protestants over religious dogma.13 The tensions between 
Protestants and Catholics call into question the natural law doctrines informing each perspective. 
Each sect of Christianity had their own way of practice, yet both went against their practice, 
violating the principles of Christian scripture of maintaining peace within God’s Image on 
earth.14   With this context in mind and placing it alongside the argument made in Montaigne’s 
Apology, it is clear that Montaigne does not accept dogma as pertaining to any real truth. This is 
 
13 Montaigne’s essays are a result of his role in the parliament of Bordeaux throughout his life, 
and his witnessing of the religious upheaval beginning when Protestant Henri de Navarre became 
an heir to the French throne, inflicting conflict between the current Catholic King Henri III, and 
Henri de Guise, the leader of the conservative Catholic League, and Navarre.  Within her essay, 
“Montaigne’s Politics: Authority and Governance in the Essays,” Biancamaria Fontina clarifies 
the time-frame Montaigne was writing, and the effect this timing had on his Essays. Her work, 
encompassing Montaigne’s career within the parliament in Bordeaux and as a writer, highlights 
the importance of Montaigne’s thought during the religious persecution taking place at the time.  
Fontina writes of Montaigne, being a Catholic as recognizing this religious sect of Christianity as 
having an “increasingly intolerant and aggressive role,” prompting him to act as a “go-between 
among…the parliament of Bordeaux, the town council, the king’s officials, the military 
commanders, and their counterparts on the Protestant side” who were participatory within the 
religious battle (Fontana 2008, 7). Further, Fontina adds how, “the Essais are difficult to classify 
in political terms, since they do not speak with the voice of a particular ideology or faction” but 
instead speak to, “the broad philosophical question of the relation between reality and 
appearance, or truth and falsity…and the practical consequences of deception” (Fontana 2008, 7 
& 23).   
14 “And let the peace of God rule in your hearts, to which indeed you were called in the one 
body. And be thankful.” (Colossians 3:15). 
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evident when he states within his essay “Man Can Have No Knowledge,” that “There is nothing 
subject to more continual agitation than the laws” (Montaigne 1958, 438). While Montaigne 
writes of our human reason as evoking us to follow the laws of the country we live in, it is clear 
that “Truth must have one face, the same and universal. If man knew any rectitude and justice 
that had one body and real existence, he would not tie it down to the condition of the customs of 
this country or that” (Montaigne 1958, 437). His primary concerns stem from one’s idea of the 
law versus another’s, i.e., what one may view just, another may view unjust. While law is 
necessary for a country’s preservation and efficiency, Montaigne writes that the dogma of natural 
law will always, “paint justice in as many colors, and refashion it into as many faces, as there are 
changes of passion in those men [who enforce this law as truth]” (Montaigne 1958, 437). Given 
human nature’s altering passions, it is clear that natural law does not contain much truth at all, 
and therefore Montaigne does not trust it as governing. To Montaigne, the antithesis of accepting 
ignorance of the unknown to enhance one’s faith is natural law, as he sees it effecting Protestants 
and Catholics by different means--thus producing religious intolerance and war in the future.15   
Accepting the limits of reason and human knowledge, the individual must overcome 
certain aspects of human nature, especially vanity. When recognizing these limits, one extends 
the same way of life to others which ultimately serves as the foundation of tolerance. Montaigne 
understands the “opinion,” of knowledge through a skeptical lens, calling it the “plague of man” 
(Montaigne 1958, 360). According to Montaigne, the knowledge we acquire from learning 
should enrich our lives on earth, and complete human nature—without corrupting it. In the 
section, “Man Has No Knowledge,” it is clear that an acceptance of our ignorance is the key to 
 
15 The Thirty Years War (1618-1648), which ensued after Montaigne’s death, was the result of 
the rise in tensions between Protestants and Catholics within Northern Europe.  
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improving the human condition. He writes, “Ignorance that knows itself, that judges itself, and 
condemns itself, is not complete ignorance: to be that it must be ignorant of itself” (Montaigne 
1958, 372). Accepting a Pyrrhonian perspective, he develops why they may seem to be correct in 
their beliefs. Their extreme skepticism, dealing with suspending their judgement and refusal to 
take part in controversial matters, is pivotal towards Montaigne’s argument for ignorance. As 
previously noted, it is clear those who remain ignorant of certain concepts and maintain a simple 
life are the happiest. This is due to their lack of judgement and desire to be correct. According to 
Montaigne, the Pyrrhonians 
take all things without adherence or consent, leads them to their Atarxy, which is a 
peaceful and sedate condition of life, exempt from the agitations we receive through the 
impression of the opinion and knowledge we have of things…They dispute in a very mild 
manner.  They do not fear contradiction in their discussion (Montaigne 1958, 373).   
 
Ignorance is not sufficient for human nature to function, therefore there will always be 
conceptions to argue over. When dealing with these philosophical concerns, Montaigne accepts 
the manner of the Pyrrhonian’s judgement. Specifically, Montaigne does so because of their 
ability to control the pernicious effects of vanity and by forming an indifferent attitude towards 
the outcome of an argument. By shedding light on the Pyrrhonian’s proper exercise of 
judgement, it is clear that Montaigne views their way as relating to true faith.16 Through his faith 
 
16   The following verses from the Bible point to why Montaigne supports the Pyrrhonist belief 
system: “A fool takes no pleasure in understanding, but only in expressing his opinion (Proverbs 
18:2); “The faith that you have, keep between yourself and God; happy is he who has no reason 
to judge himself for what he approves” (Romans 14:22). The former expresses the correct belief 
that Christians should carry in suspending all judgement for the betterment of the individual and 
to live in accordance with Biblical teaching.  The latter presents the notion of keeping our 
judgements towards ourselves and others, in the private atmosphere between ourselves and with 
God in prayer.  
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and Catholic beliefs, Montaigne is not a Pyrrhonist, but argues that their line of thought is 
tolerant and consistent with divine teachings.   
 Human nature prevents man from coming to full agreement on the correctness of 
knowledge. According to Montaigne, “even the most gifted and ablest scholars, [can come to 
agreement] on even that the sky is over our head” and that “it is easy to see by the confusion that 
our judgement gives to our own selves, and the uncertainty that each man feels within himself, 
that it has a very insecure seat…How many times we change our notions” (Montaigne 1958, 
423)! To facilitate an understanding of Montaigne’s thought, scholar Alan Levine (2001) lays out 
his assessment of Montaigne’s solution to the inadequacies of human knowledge, in his book 
entitled Sensual Philosophy. He writes that Montaigne’s “solution to the unruliness of the human 
mind is to make people more content with the human condition as it is…He aims to focus on the 
self in order to combat itself” (Levine 2001, 4-5). The major implication of this, according to 
Levine, is that it is neither the political nor economic systems that fuel intolerance. Rather, the 
true source of intolerance is found in “half-baked intellectuals and fanatics” who have in 
common an unruliness of the mind (Levine 2001, 3).  To combat this, Levine points to 
Montaigne’s understanding of introspection, especially within the section entitled, “Man Can 
Have No Knowledge” and as Montaigne continuously does throughout the Apology. Montaigne 
speaks of himself in this section, understanding that he too falls prey to the fundamental 
incorrectness of his own thoughts in adapting a position similar to others. He writes:  
Many times (as I sometimes do deliberately), having undertaken as exercise and sport to 
maintain an opinion contrary to my own, my mind, applying itself and turning in that 
direction, attaches me to it so firmly that I can no longer find the reason for my former 
opinion, and I abandon it. I draw myself along in almost any direction I lean, whatever it 
may be, and carry myself away by my own weight (Montaigne 1958, 426).  
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Montaigne develops a similar habit to those philosophers that he seems disagree with in their 
approaches. It is the “diversity of our passions” that leads one to level our virtues (Montaigne 
1958, 427). Human nature can have no real perception of truth through our knowledge, as this is 
a position that only God obtains; i.e. no one will ever live exactly how another person does, nor 
will he/she perceive life the same way. If faith informs human nature that one lives in God’s 
image, it can be said that our differences are not particularly bad but are only applicable to 
ourselves. Levine speaks to Montaigne’s resemblance to Socrates, in how they both write in 
agreement that, “knowledge of ignorance strips away many of the causes—metaphysical and 
religious truth claims—that cause intolerance and persecution” (Levine 2001, 6). Here, Levine 
points to ignorance as the common threat of humanity. When one casts aside pride and 
recognizes this in oneself, it becomes possible to tolerate others. Moreover, while disputes that 
one may have over his/her knowledge are inevitable to the human condition, Montaigne invokes 
individuals to combat this tendency with a view toward self-knowledge as the foundation for 
peace. Consistent with a humanist approach to religious tolerance, Montaigne sheds light on 
human nature, as having the ability to improve itself, through faith and self-awareness.   
Montaigne on the Purpose of the Essay 
 In recognizing the proper solutions to the ills of human nature that Montaigne assesses 
within the Apology, one must analyze the form in which he is writing—the essay. Montaigne is 
established as the inventor of the essay form as a genre as he coined the term “essayer” meaning 
“to attempt” or “to try.”17 The key to understanding a skeptic, according to Levine, is the 
 
17 Montaigne’s use of essayer is an extension of the original Latin verb (exagium) the French 
word derived from. In the Latin, exagium can be understood in terms of weighing, sifting, and 
winnowing. To weigh is what one must do when differentiating the pros and cons of a particular 
choice. This includes consideration of what it good versus bad, right versus wrong. As such, the 
notion of weighting seems to have an inherently skeptical quality to it. This skepticism, 
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understand his “starting point, or the thing he does not doubt,” which to Montaigne is the 
conception of the “evanescent self,” i.e., the constant changing state of an individual (Levine 
2011, 265). Levine describes Montaigne’s differentiation of the essay from a treatise or tract, 
“calling the latter claim to present truth, whereas Montaigne claims no such thing for his essay. 
He merely claims to ‘try’ to ‘grapple’ with issues (Levine 2011, 228). In the Apology, Montaigne 
does not merely discuss what is true or false within human nature, but rather acknowledges how 
human nature may be incorrect in exercising their thought, by “exploring topics from every 
conceivable angle” (Levine 2011, 228). Given human nature’s inherent capability to change 
opinions, or conform to them for that matter, Montaigne points to the act of essaying to find 
oneself and provide their own truths in a healthy way.  
While Montaigne remains true to his beliefs in one sense, he exercises self-reproach even 
discussing where he may err in his thought. He writes, “I do nothing but come and go. My 
judgement does not always go forward; it floats, it strays” (Montaigne 1958, 426). Montaigne 
discusses a number of ills in human thought, pertaining to reason, faith, knowledge, and 
ignorance. His analysis implies that tolerance is contingent upon our ability to think for 
ourselves. This requires, according to Montaigne, “abandoning and renouncing one’s own 
means” in order to be able to fully grasp the concept of our relationship to God and our place 
within His image (Montaigne 1958, 457). If there is no true way to combat these inherent ills 
within human nature, Montaigne suggests individuals to have a greater sense of self-knowledge, 
 
consequently, allows one to compare and contrast with moral weights of various ideas, beliefs, 
and arguments. One is thus able to apply the results of this weighing and apply them to one’s 
own life.  In contrast, the idea of the essay as simply an opportunity to try something out, seems 
to place less of a burden on the writer. Here, the writer attempts something primarily as a 
response to curiosity or is just being playful. Both of these seem to lack the moral seriousness 
that is a key part of Montaigne’s view of the essay.   
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which is illuminated through the act of essaying. Through essaying one finds, “everything and 
nothing” which to Montaigne is “what we are, the best he thinks we can genuinely do, and it 
supplies with a never-ending source of wonder and delight” (Levine 2011, 248). Significantly, 
self-knowledge aids in the improvement of human nature, yet it is impossible to comply with 
Montaigne’s thought when vanity and reason are unlimited. Essaying, in the way recommended 
by Montaigne, provides limits on vanity and reason. By keeping these bound, Montaigne lays out 
a solution to the worst parts of life.18 
 To Montaigne, the root of intolerance is filled with the vast accumulation of opinions 
within a majority of people, which trigger the self to conform to them, and alienate one from any 
sense of self-knowledge. Within, “Man Can Have No Knowledge,” Montaigne writes of the 
“common herd,” as human nature having the tendency to, “incessantly receive more and more 
different impressions, the last one always effacing the preceding one” (Montaigne 1958, 429). 
The origin of dogma is grounded upon a group identity, which causes Montaigne’s disbelief of 
 
18  Judith Shklar’s interpretation of Montaigne places his concern with cruelty at the center of 
both his moral and political teaching. At the core of Montaigne’s thought is recognition of the 
distinction between the sin of pride and other sins. According to Shklar (2006, 81), “Sins are 
transgressions of a divine rule and offenses against God; pride, as the rejection of God, must 
always be the worst one, which gives rise to all others. Cruelty, as the willful inflicting of 
physical pain on a weaker being in order to cause anguish and fear, however, is wrong done 
entirely to another creature.” The problem with cruelty, according to both Shklar and 
Montaigne, is that it has been placed ahead of pride in importance which effectively closes off 
any appeal to religion, God, and morality. Shklar (2006, 81) writes, “By putting it [cruelty] 
irrevocably first—with nothing above it, and with nothing to excuse or forgive acts of cruelty—
one closes off any appeal to any order than that of actuality.” For politics, this separation has the 
effect of opening the “door to Machiavellism to a degree that was impossible and intolerable for 
Montaigne” (2006, 92). In other words, a politics without a moral foundation that concerns itself 
only with the prudent exercise of power is not good for politics of for humanity. Perhaps the 
clearest example of this for Montaigne is the treatment of indigenous populations in the New 
World by Spain (2006, 84). In response to this political reality, Montaigne encourages his 
readers to focus on what lies within their control—their own selves. According to Shklar (2006, 
92), our “ability to control our personal life, even if only in isolation, was greater than our 
collective existence where Fortune ruled.”  
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any specific dogma in particular. Montaigne contends, “We must not believe every man, says the 
maxim, because any man may say anything;” therefore, the only force that has the power to 
expel this truth that dogmatists aim to reach is the “divine and miraculous metamorphosis” 
brought upon by the Divine (Montaigne 1958, 430 & 457). Montaigne’s essays are combative 
toward the nature of typical philosophic dogma, as he often leads open-ended questions 
explicitly unanswered throughout the Apology. He does this, “not simply to persuade the reader 
about their truths. That is the aim of the dogmatist, someone with certainty of their convictions. 
Rather, the aim of Montaigne’s writing . . . is to move you to find your own truth, your own self” 
(Levine 2011, 229). Montaigne is clear that philosophic and religious dogma results in cruelty 
amongst the human condition in the form of intolerant positions and inflation in a majority’s 
passions (see Shklar 1989). Essaying allows one to engage with the substantial issues Montaigne 
proposes within his text, along with the unanswered questions he asks directed towards the 
reader, i.e., all of such questions, specifically surrounded by the ultimate skeptical one of “What 
do I know?” Essaying is facilitative to a more tolerant way of life, by allowing one to focus on 
the self, to combat the self, and ultimately focus on becoming the author of one’s own truth for 
the self’s purpose.   
Conclusion 
 Through an analysis of the Apology, Montaigne seeks to better human nature, and the 
problems that are inherently associated within us, in order to further a more tolerant way of life. 
Human reason and knowledge must be limited within the scope of our faith, given that general 
truth is not accessible to all—it is simply a Divine quality to hold such knowledge. Accepting 
our own ignorance allows us to combat human vanity. It does so because the skepticism that 
leads to this recognition forces man to look inward and self-evaluate. It is the move inward and 
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away from external concerns that makes possible human progress according to Montaigne.  
Levine remarks on the self-knowing self as 
happy and content “at home.” Unlike conceptions of the self which envision the good as 
the satisfaction of material desires or willing one’s will, in Montaigne’s conception, the 
self has no interest in violating others. Moreover, since what the self finds in itself is a 
king of ultimate emptiness, the self has nothing to force. And finally, Montaigne argues 
that self-aware people feel each other’s pain (Levine 2001, 7). 
 
Montaigne’s work within the Apology, is reflective of his own purpose for healthily combatting 
extreme skepticism, while also encouraging of the reader to take part in self-reflection, to deepen 
one’s understanding of the self, to make one more aware when being asked their opinion on a 
present issue, and to have empathy for humankind as a whole. Unlike Emerson, Montaigne uses 
his curiosity as a skeptic to better himself as an individual, without relying solely on the moral 
sense. Seemingly accordant with his Catholic beliefs, Montaigne’s efforts to promote self-
knowledge move future essayists to exercise their skepticism in a healthy way, while also 
moving spiritually as they grow more in tune with themselves and their purpose within God’s 
image—to form their own earthly, governing truth, that is simply exclusive to the self.   As one 
can see, the act of essaying is a moral act brought about through skepticism.  
 As one can see, Montaigne’s thoughts throughout the Apology are consistent with 
improving the human condition. By establishing a connection between reason, knowledge, and 
faith, one can understand Montaigne’s position as a humanist. Through his defense of Sebond 
and the sections that follow, Montaigne provides human nature with the tool to acquire 
tolerance—self-knowledge and the act of essaying. He seeks to correct the incorrect notions that 
humankind promotes as true, in order to improve one’s experience on earth. While we cannot 
control the passions and opinions of others, Montaigne contends that we can control our own—in 
order to live happily and peacefully as the Divine intends.   
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Chapter 3: Bacon, Montaigne, and the Philosophic Purpose of the Essay 
 
 
Montaigne uses the essay to explore the limits of human understanding. In particular, the 
essay and essaying allow individuals to explore the limits of both their own experience and 
understanding. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, Montaigne’s skeptical stance has 
everything to do with the improvement of oneself. As Montaigne demonstrates in his own 
writing, the act of essaying is a tool one can use to combat extreme forms of skepticism, with the 
intent of acquiring a more tolerant mindset than before. The act of essay writing, therefore, is 
essential to Montaigne’s humanist project. 
In order to gain additional insight on human nature’s capacity to learn and the role of the 
essay, one may turn to Francis Bacon and his intellectual project. As a statesperson and lawyer, 
Bacon used essays to promote his philosophic enterprise. At the heart of this enterprise is a 
radical reformulation of what constitutes knowledge and the best means of acquiring knowledge. 
Unlike his Scholastic predecessors, Bacon seeks to place learning and knowledge on a scientific 
foundation in order to produce a body of knowledge that improves the condition of mankind.  
Through an analysis of his major works, including his The Advancement of Learning and his 
letters, this chapter pursues the question of what the role of the essay and essaying are in Bacon’s 
larger intellectual enterprise. As demonstrated below, it is clear that Bacon’s purpose as a 
philosopher is incomplete without an understanding of his purpose as a rhetorician.   
 In this chapter, I analyze Bacon’s depiction of improving the human condition. In his 
Advice to Fulke Greville and Letter to Lord Burgheley, Bacon seems to offer his advice—which 
in turn unfolds into his own, personal, project for learning. In his Advancement of Learning, he 
addresses King James I, and offers his way in which human knowledge can be expanded and our 
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way of learning, corrected. Then, in a comparative analysis of Montaigne and Bacon a clear 
distinction of how the two philosophers differ in their approach to the philosophic purpose of the 
essay, the acquirement of knowledge, and the betterment of human nature will be established.  
 The foundation of Bacon’s goal in improving human nature’s capacity for knowledge is 
an understanding of his evaluation of learning at his time. While he does not limit what we 
should and should not learn, Bacon is critical of the state of learning because it “stifled genuine 
science and retarded human progress—bound political power to theological power” (Weinberger 
2001, x). For Bacon, this way of learning goes wrong because of the marriage of politics and 
religion.  Bacon notes, that this problem should have been resolved by Christianity as it provides 
a clear distinction between what is created in the image of God (mankind) and nature. According 
to Bacon, the former’s connection to the divine render knowledge of man and the human soul 
beyond study. In contrast, the study of nature has no such limitation. The problem, as Bacon sees 
it, is that the blending of philosophy and theology leads to an understanding of nature that is 
largely removed from study. Consequently, nature cannot be turned to the benefit of mankind.   
For Bacon, both philosophy and religion should be studied separately. He mentions this 
in the first book of The Advancement of Learning when he contends that “the true dignity and 
value of learning” can only be realized when one recognizes that there are  
two principal duties and services, besides ornament and illustration, which philosophy 
and human learning do perform to faith and religion. The one because they are an 
effectual inducement to the exaltation of the glory of God. The other, because they 
minister a singular help and preservative against unbelief and error (Bacon 2002, 153). 
 
Philosophic and scientific thought, therefore, are grounded in the intent to speak to the 
glory of God. This distinguishes Bacon from the schoolmen who give primacy to the glory of 
God at the expense of scientific progress. The positive correlation between knowledge and 
religion envisioned by Bacon, does not limit nor preclude the scientific study of nature. Rather, 
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by contending that religion and nature should be studies separately, Bacon argues that an 
individual’s purpose is heightened—becoming more apt than before to study, learn, and draw 
conclusions. Freed from the limits of scholastic religion, Bacon transforms religion from a 
potential source of human corruption into a source of human benefit. Bacon’s key to doing this is 
to limit the study of religion to its proper sphere and object.   
Besides locating philosophy and religion to their proper spheres of inquiry, Bacon 
contends that it is also necessary to change how one approaches the acquisition of knowledge.  
In his, Advice to Fulke Greville on his Studies, Bacon lays out his idea of proper discourse. 
Bacon writes “and though you get nothing else by this idle discourse, yet you shall learn this, 
that if you will have your friend perform what you require, you must require nothing above his 
strength” (Bacon 2002, 102). Given that our ability to acquire knowledge is one gifted to us by 
God, Bacon is not fond of “idleness,” in learning or time wasted on topics unimportant to us or 
studied in vain. Nor, according to Bacon, should one sample from different bodies of knowledge. 
He offers this advice then proceeds in his advice Greville, writing, “he that hath such 
abridgements of all the arts shall have a general notion of all kinds of knowledge. But he shall be 
like a man of many trades, that thrives less than he that seriously follows one” (Bacon 2002, 
102).  According to his instructions, it is better for one to learn a single topic thoroughly as 
opposed to multiple in order to properly “thrive” and succeed. Bacon’s intellectual project, 
therefore, rejects the scholastic emphasis on what we currently refer to as the well-rounded 
liberal arts education. Instead, Bacon argues for the important role of experts who can apply their 
knowledge to improving the human condition. To learn and contribute to Bacon’s project, one 
must separate the studies of religion and science, engage in discourse with a purpose, and be 
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selective as to the topics we choose to learn. By doing so, experts drive Bacon’s scientific 
project. 
 Bacon’s concern with improving the condition of mankind through the application of 
science is evident in his Letter to Lord Burghley. There, Bacon identifies the development and 
application of knowledge as the proper ends of government. Sharing his views with the chief 
advisor to the Queen, Bacon writes of his “ordinary course of study and meditation [which are] 
more painful than most parts of action are” while noting that he is “tied by all [his] duties, both 
of a good patriot, and of an unworthy kinsman, and of an obliged servant to employ whatsoever 
[he is] to do [Lord Burghley] service” (Bacon 2002, 20). Here, Bacon reveals that the purpose of 
knowledge is to serve the sovereign to contribute to the good of the community. In the same 
vein, this notion is central to Bacon’s intellectual project. Knowledge should be put to use, in 
order for it to be deemed important. In Book One of his Advancement of Learning, Bacon 
references the King of England in a similar way as he did with Lord Burghley, writing: 
Nay the same Salomon the king, although he excelled in the glory of treasure and 
magnificent buildings . . . yet he maketh no claim to any of those glories, but only to the 
glory of inquisition of truth; for so he saith expressly, “The glory of God is to conceal a 
thing, but the glory of the king is to find it out (Bacon 2002, 151). 
 
Acknowledging the King of England, Bacon calls for the King to live and rule as Salomon did. 
Bacon’s interpretation of Salomon suggests an important distinction regarding the purpose of 
knowledge. Most people, according to Bacon, seek knowledge for the following reasons: “upon a 
natural curiosity and inquisitive appetite; sometimes to entertain their minds with variety and 
delight; sometimes for ornament and reputation; and sometimes to enable them to victory of wit 
and contradiction; and most times for lucre and profession” (Bacon 2002, 147). All of these, 
Bacon suggests, are superficial justifications for the importance of knowledge. Genuine 
knowledge, in contrast, is “a gift of reason, to the benefit and use of men” (Bacon 2002, 147). In 
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order to move past the limitations of the state of learning confronted by Bacon and implement 
Bacon’s larger project, it is necessary to persuade the public that such a change is necessary. 
Thus, Bacon must rely on rhetoric to move both public and elite opinion in order to reap the 
benefits of his intellectual project.  
 The way in which knowledge is conveyed is contingent on one’s moral character.  Bacon 
notes that knowledge is “subject to the laws of heaven and earth, which are the subject of 
philosophy and therefore the true knowledge of the nature and state of the soul, must come by 
the same inspiration that gave the substance” (Bacon 2002, 215).  Proper philosophic inquiry, 
deals with the laws of heaven and earth, and any work that does not deal with either, to Bacon, is 
useless and anything that is physical can and should be studied. Anything dealing with the soul, 
however, is not fair to make judgements on as no one has any tangible, truthful, believe of how 
one’s soul is formed.  It is quintessential to Bacon’s project that the laws of God and man are 
separate. While Christian beliefs may sway one to believe otherwise, the Bible is clear that we 
can try to prepare ourselves to understand our soul, but faith is ultimately what combines our 
soul and our physical self—which does not hold any value of truth to others and therefore is 
rendered unimportant to Bacon. Nature, broadly defined, is subject to the scientific method 
whereas the soul is not. Thus, the soul needs to be regulated by something like religion, but time 
should not be wasted in the idle study of the soul.   
The Second Book of Bacon’s Advancement of Learning outlines the fundamental role 
rhetoric plays in his innovative plan for learning going forward. To understand this role, it is 
necessary to remember that Bacon distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge. The first 
respects the faculties of the mind, or “understanding and reason,” and the other “will, appetite, 
and affection whereof the former produceth position or decree, the latter action or execution” 
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(Bacon 2002, 217). While the first of these concerns his understanding and reason, connected to 
position or decree, and the second concerns human will and sentiment being connected to action,  
“the imagination is an agent or the nuncius in both provinces, both the judicial and the 
ministerial” (Bacon 2002, 217). To Bacon, religion controls one’s consideration and facilitates 
judgement. In affirming or denying, one consults both his/her reason and will in order to 
properly make a decision, or in this case accept a specific truth or not. According to Bacon, 
concrete knowledge is possible, and it is what is invisible and imagined that distorts 
understanding. Searching for a way to make the soul accessible, human nature mistakenly 
elevates the importance of human imagination. Bacon writes, “in the matters of faith and 
religion, raise our imagination above our reason, which is the cause why religion sought ever 
access to the mind by similitudes” (Bacon 2002, 218).  Here, Bacon points to religion as having 
imaginative qualities, i.e., providing religious teaching through “parables, visions and dreams” 
(Bacon 2002, 218).  While Bacon is an advocate for the physical, present world, he does not 
deny or reject human nature’s faith in these perhaps imaginative scriptural teachings as providing 
comfort and the feeling that the soul is safe.  For religious purposes imagination is permissible, 
however for Bacon’s project for learning, the imagination must be regulated. While imagination, 
can be a “recommendation,” to reason, Bacon holds that reason governs the imagination, and 
rhetoric is the tool one uses to control and limit the imagination.  
These two types of knowledge play a role in Bacon’s analysis of rhetoric as he writes, 
“for the imaginative or insinuative reason, which is the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to 
refer it to the arts of reason . . . human philosophy which respecteth the faculties of the mind of 
man hath two parts, rational and moral” (Bacon 2002, 218). Rational knowledge to Bacon is the 
type which is filled with, “the most wits and the least delight,” and prefer the type “drenched in 
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flesh and blood, civil history, morality, policy, about the which men’s affections, praises, and 
fortunes do turn and are conversant” (Bacon 2002, 218). Here, Bacon identifies the fundamental 
role that writing plays in acquiring knowledge. 
As much as Bacon is critical of the imagination, he almost always seems to be so when 
discussing religion and how it has let the imagination dominate when reason should be in charge. 
Those who write in an imaginative way, through parables for instance in Biblical teachings, link 
all truth that comes from this to imagination. Bacon’s intention is that human nature will 
recognize that we can have concrete knowledge, through reason, with rhetoric playing a crucial 
role in our ability to acquire knowledge.  In laying out his understanding, Bacon suggests that 
scientific reasoning and the proper rhetoric are the keys to achieving excellence in learning, 
through the courses of “preparation and suggestion” (Bacon 2002, 223).  The key to making 
inferences is to prepare, which Bacon notes, “seemeth scarcely a part of knowledge, consisting 
rather of diligence than of any artificial erudition” (Bacon 2002, 223).  Here, it is evident that 
Bacon supports the use of hypotheses in his new program of learning, and by testing our 
assumptions one can come closer to truths than before.  To explain this notion, Bacon uses his 
example of Aristotle and his rebuttal of the Sophists as he writes,  
And herein Aristotle wittily but hurtfully doth deride the sophists near his time, saying 
‘they did as if one that professed the art of show making should not teach how to make up 
a show, but only exhibit the readiness a number of shoes of all fashions and sizes.’ But 
yet a man might reply, that if a shoe-maker should have no shoes in his shop, but only 
work he has bespoken, he should be weakly customed (Bacon 2002, 223) 
 
The problem with Sophist’s teachings is that there was no explanation to their preparation; in 
other words, they would make inferences but not be able to fully explain them properly.  This 
explaining, Bacon states, we get through, “suggestion,” or by testing different ideas in order to 
find the correct one.  One can suggest an idea is true based on one’s own preparation but can 
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only determine it universally true through scientific testing.  Coincidentally, Bacon gives an 
explanation for his reasoning behind keeping the study of the human soul illicit throughout his 
project—as it cannot be tested empirically.  
 To Bacon, the relationship between morality and reason is reinforced through the form in 
which it is presented—through rhetoric.  Conducive to his explanation of how to engross oneself 
in philosophic inquiry, Bacon seeks to advise writers of his time to make changes in their habits. 
He gives his advice, writing “Neither is the nature of man so unfortunately built as that those 
powers and arts should have force to disturb reason, and not to establish and advance it” (Bacon 
2002, 238).  By nature, man is capable of rationality and reason, however one’s reason is limited 
by what one can observe on earth, and what we can thoughtfully explain.  He explains the ends 
to which logic, morality and rhetoric attempt to meet, as he writes: 
the end of logic is to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to entrap it; the end 
of Morality is to procure the affections to obey reason, and not to obey it; the end of rhetoric 
is to fill the imagination to second reason, and not to oppress it: for these abuses of arts come 
in but ex obliquo for caution (Bacon 2002, 238). 
 
Here, Bacon states while reason may be limited and one’s morality solidifies one’s judgement on 
things, imagination is a guide, and our will gets us to act on what one learns. Rhetoric is 
designed for human action to be directed in a particular way, while reason cannot be disturbed as 
it contains scientific truth. Imagination, “seconds reason” as Bacon notes because it is directly 
involved in one’s ability to “prepare” and “suggest.” Consequently, the way in which one writes 
has the ability to provide the proper change to get at Bacon’s ideal end, i.e., extending and 
providing knowledge that will be useful and beneficial to the public. It is clear, therefore, that 
Bacon speaks to writing as provoking change.  
 One of the then current issues that Bacon found with rhetoric during his time, was the use 
of grammar, or “the measure, sound, and elevation or accent, and the sweetness and harshness of 
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[words]” (Bacon 2002, 232). He rejects poesy, “as we consider it in respect of the verse and not 
of the argument,” and instead focuses on examining, “the power and nature of words as they are 
the footsteps and prints of reason: which kind of analogy between words and reason is handled 
spurism, brokenly, though not entirely” (Bacon 2002, 232).  Spurism, or the strict adherence to 
language and the purity of it, is one of the aspects of rhetoric that Bacon thinks writing must 
improve upon.  He writes of the one who delivers knowledge through writing must want to, 
“deliver it in such form as may best be believed, and not as may be best examined,” keeping in 
mind that “present satisfaction” from one’s audience is a better expectation to hope for rather 
than “expectant inquiry” (Bacon 2002, 233).  Here, Bacon is clear that while there is some value 
in the way we articulate language, the main importance that he is getting at is within the mode of 
writing that he suggests. How language is transmitted must evolve, and to do this, it is clear that 
this essay is the mode of writing that would best serve Bacon’s fundamental goal of rhetoric.   
Change is determined by how the public thinks in order to be in a position to implement his 
program, it may be the case that Bacon does not view the essay and essaying as having any 
inherent philosophic purpose. Rather, the essay is just one of many possible modes of writing 
that serve very specific purposes, that will serve as a catalyst to those who wish to learn more 
about a given topic.   
According to Bacon, the classification of the intellection arts is four-fold, and based on 
their respective ends: first is the art of inquiry or invention, which is to invent that which is 
sought or propounded (Classification 1); second is the art of examination of memory, which is to 
judge what is invented (Classification 2); the third is the art of custody of memory, which is to 
retain that which is judged (Classification 3); and lastly, the art of elocution or tradition, which is 
to deliver what is retained (Classification 4) (Bacon 2002, 219).  Rhetoric is the key factor in 
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accomplishing and maintaining this classification that Bacon aims for.  Bacon suggests the 
aphorism as a method to deliver knowledge in a cohesive way.  Laying out the effects of this 
method, he contends “no man can suffice nor in reason attempt to write Aphorisms, but he that is 
sound and ground,” given that writing a reasonable aphorism requires, “illustration [be] cut off; 
recitals of examples [be] cut off; discourse of connection and order [be] cut off; descriptions of 
practice [be] cut off; so there remaineth nothing to fill the aphorisms but some good quantity of 
observation” (Bacon 2002, 234).  It is apparent that Bacon’s notion of the aphorism as the “pith 
and heart of sciences,” stems from his understanding that the method of delivery ought to be 
brought about in a succinct way, i.e., Bacon’s plan for the evolution of human knowledge 
requires one to state exactly what one is trying to say in a concise manner. Inadvertently, 
essaying is as important to Bacon as he claims the aphorism to be, even though he never 
references the essay exactly.  More expansive than an aphorism, the form of the essay aims to 
accomplish all of the goals in which the aphorism does. To further this point, Bacon writes, “But 
knowledge that is delivered as a thread to be spun on, ought to be delivered and intimated, if it 
were possible, in the same method wherein it was invented, and so it is possible of knowledge 
induced” (Bacon 2002, 233-34).  For Bacon, invention (Classification 1) is done through his 
inductive scientific method. The same inductive process is key to judgment (Classification 2 
above). This means that Bacon’s understanding of method in terms of it as a means of studying 
and interpreting natural phenomena should have a place in the fourth classification where he 
locates writing. If he intends on persuading people to accept his Method, it should be an aspect 
of every part of inquiry as this reinforces his idea—and if this line of thinking is correct, his 
essay should all be characterized by the use of inductive reasoning.  
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If Bacon is correct, and rhetoric has the potential to enable a change in learning, one must 
write persuasively, as Bacon does to the King and to the statesmen, while also making sure that 
the form is concise enough to grasp one’s attention and accessible enough through the proper 
dialect.  While writing an essay allows one to explore persuasive writing, the form also facilitates 
persuasion as well.  Bacon holds there “remain two appendixes touching the tradition of 
knowledge, the one Critical, the other pedantical” (Bacon 2002, 241).  According to Bacon, these 
are the components of learning.  The “pedantical” holds truth that has already been discovered, 
while the “critical,” is what still has to be uncovered through reason.   The purpose of man is to 
acquire knowledge, to which Bacon affirms, “For all knowledge is either delivered by teachers, 
or attained by men’s proper endeavours: and therefore, as the principal part of tradition of 
knowledge concerneth chiefly writing of books, so the relative part thereof concerneth reading of 
books” (Bacon 2002, 241).  It is clear that human nature acquires knowledge through teachings 
in school or through books, however, to further this project one turns to the essay.  While Bacon 
makes note of the aphorism as a medium for an audience to gain knowledge, being so short and 
open ended they can only create wonder for a learner.  The next medium, therefore, would be an 
essay, to which one can gain a bit more knowledge, become inspired, and turn to the reading of 
books for even more information. The development and transmission of knowledge for public 
use, is therefore done through increments and succession from one mode of rhetoric to another. 





In this section of the chapter, I will use a comparative analysis of essays written by 
Montaigne and Bacon that address the same or a similar topic to show how their respective 
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understandings of the purpose of the essay play out in practice. Evidently, Bacon and Montaigne 
share a common enterprise—to uncover the limits and extent to which human knowledge and 
understanding is possible. Here, I will be comparing the following essays: 1) Montaigne’s “On 
Ceremonies in the Interview of Kings” with Bacon’s “On Ceremonies and Respects,” 2) 
Montaigne’s “On Friendship” with Bacon’s essay of the same title, 3) Montaigne’s “Glory” with 
Bacon’s “Vain Glory,” and 4) Montaigne’s “Books” with Bacon’s “Studies.” Through analyzing 
the two authors, each author has their own understanding of the essay and the role of essaying in 
philosophy.  For Bacon, the essay serves as an auxiliary tool of philosophy in order to persuade 
his audience. Montaigne on the other hand uses the essay as a form of Socratic inquiry to 
oneself, in order to better the self alone.  By aligning Montaigne and Bacon together, one will 
find that each philosopher’s purpose for the essay is different, yet equally important when 
determining the act of essaying in higher education and in life.  
Bacon and Montaigne on Ceremonies 
 Bacon and Montaigne have contrasting opinions on the purpose of ruling and ceremonies. 
In “Of Ceremonies and Respects,” Bacon gives advice directly to monarchs and speaks of “the 
praise and commendation of men” (Bacon 2002, 441). He lays out the purpose of ceremony, and 
the consequences of not using them. To Bacon, one that holds a ceremony should have a respect 
for himself, and those who do not, “teach[es] others not to use them again and so diminisheth 
respect to himself” (Bacon 2002, 441). He notes that the tedious dwelling on ceremony, 
however, “diminish[es] the faith and credit of him who speaks” (Bacon 2002, 442). Therefore, 
for those who maintain office of any sort, Bacon's recommendation to statesmen is to hold 
ceremony but so it be with demonstration that a man doth it upon regard and not upon facility. It 
is a good precept generally in seconding another, yet to add something of one’s own” (Bacon 
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2002, 442). Here, Bacon states that while it is good to apply oneself, as Bacon does in his essays 
to the monarchy, it needs to be done through demonstration and not just through, “cheap” 
display, copied by another. Throughout this essay, Bacon speaks toward the monarch and is able 
to give his unsolicited advice as he pleases through the form in which he writes—the essay. He 
concludes this essay writing “A wise man will make more opportunities than he finds. Men’s 
behavior should be like their apparel, not too straight or point device, but free for exercise and 
motion” (Bacon 2002, 442). Bacon is able to dictate his own behavior through his writing in an 
essay format, without exterior opinions. He is able to liken himself, to someone like the King, 
and even go so far as offer such advice. Consequently, he seems to be using the essay as an 
additional means for persuading the public. Similar to the rituals of ceremony, essaying gives 
Bacon the opportunity to support and advance his larger argument. It advances philosophy 
without necessarily serving any inherent philosophic purpose, serving a rhetorical role and seeks 
primarily to persuade people to be open to the possibility of the types of reforms Bacon 
recommends. 
In “Ceremony of Interviews between Kings,” Montaigne touches upon the relationship 
between ceremony and the topic of vanity. Ordinary rules dictate that it is a discourtesy, both 
toward an equal and more so toward a superior, to fail to be at home when you have been 
notified that another was coming (Montaigne 1958, 32). Engrained in the act of ceremony lies 
the vain etiquette that goes along with it. Such vanity is defined in what Montaigne describes in 
the widespread respectable and civil notion for a king to wait at home in order to receive his 
visitors when they arrive. Unlike kings of his time, Montaigne often forgets “both of these vain 
formalities, just as[he] cut[s] off all ceremony on [his] house” and while taking into 
consideration how this rejection of practice may offend others he writes, “It is better for me to 
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offend him once than myself every day; that would be perpetual slavery” (Montaigne 1958, 32). 
The problem with manners and etiquette is the formality by which they are presented, and how 
they breed arrogant and vain behavior amongst men. Such ceremonial practices, as Montaigne 
discusses are exercises in vanity (Montaigne 1958, 32). In identifying the possible value in such 
rules, Montaigne writes that one should learn the, “knowledge of social dexterity” which he 
compares to “grace and beauty” because “it acts as a moderator at the first approaches of 
sociability and familiarity, and consequently opens the door for us to learning by examples of 
others, and to bring forth and displaying our own example if it has anything instructive and 
communicable about it” (Montaigne 1958, 33).  Montaigne indicates some irony here, as he 
mentions if there is anything of value within ceremony. Recalling from Montaigne’s Apology, 
one can see how the essay is designed to address human vanity.  With a proper degree of 
skepticism will one understand the limits of their own knowledge and, consequently, limit 
human vanity. The problem with ceremony is that is appeals to vanity and reinforces it. This 
suggests that Bacon’s argument for the proper use of ceremony is very much an exercise in 
vanity from the perspective of Montaigne.  However, through addressing the King, Bacon is able 
to hold and provide advice in his own way without the formalities of ceremony that Montaigne 
rejects. In this way, Bacon’s way of ceremony in the form of an essay bolsters Montaigne’s 
argument for ceremony, with the essay as the tool to provide council in the proper way.  
Although one can find similarities between Bacon and Montaigne in their use of the 
essay, there remains a key difference between the two.  Bacon uses the essay for purposes that 
are external to the individual. He tries to persuade the monarch to believe that what he is 
contending is correct.  However, Montaigne on the other hand, appeals to self-understanding of 
the individual. Whereas Bacon’s purpose for writing is external, Montaigne seeks the 
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gratification of turning inward and becoming a better person in the long run. This speaks to a 
fundamental difference between the two with regard to the nature and purpose of philosophy. 
Like almost all modern philosophers, Bacon sees philosophy as a tool for social and political 
reform. The triumph of experience and reason will result in man’s ability to control and make 
use of nature to make our lives more comfortable and longer. In contrast, a reading of Montaigne 
suggests that philosophy plays a fundamentally private role in the human condition. Here, 
Montaigne echoes the words of Socrates who contends that it is necessary “if someone who 
really fights for the just is going to preserve himself even for a short time, it is necessary for him 
to lead a private rather than a public life” (Apology 32a).  
Bacon and Montaigne on Friendship 
Bacon differentiates his advice and counsel to the King from others in his essay, “Of 
Friendship.” In order to prove himself as a credible statesman, Bacon presents his advice to the 
King as he believes a true friend should. Given the social nature of man, he writes, “whosoever is 
delighted in solitude is either a wild beast or a God” (Bacon 2002, 391).  To both Bacon and 
Montaigne, friendship fills the void of solitude, and without it “the world is but a wilderness” 
(Bacon 2002, 391).  Bacon lays out his understanding of friendship by providing the reasoning 
for why friendship is so important, while Montaigne defines true friendship by eliminating what 
many perceive it to be. By contrasting both authors’ views, one can see how each authors’ view 
of friendship is essential when understanding their philosophic projects and their way of 
essaying. 
In “Of Friendship,” Bacon discusses the three “fruits,” or values, of friendship.  As 
opposed to being trapped in solitude, Bacon contends that the first fruit of friendship allows for 
one to feel, “ease and discharge of the fulness and swellings of the hear, which passions of all 
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kinds do cause and induceth” (Bacon 2002, 391).  Friendship has the effect of emotionally 
opening up one’s heart, and to share with someone “griefs, joys, fears, hopes, suspicions, 
counsels, and whatsoever lieth upon the heart to oppress it, in a kind of civil shrift or confession” 
(Bacon 2002, 391). Although friendship “redoubleth joys and cutteth griefs in halfs, Bacon 
mentions counsel as an important part of friendship; i.e. the giving and taking of advice. This 
interaction is one that Bacon conveys frequently, especially in his essays.  Not only does he write 
for the sake of convincing and persuading the public, but they are also an effort to persuade the 
crown as well. When seeking Bacon’s idea of the philosophic purpose of the essay, he does not 
clearly state what he believes this purpose to be, but his intent is within the first part of his 
Advancement of Learning.  In the beginning of Part One, Bacon makes the correlation between a 
tribute of duty and affection to the King, so as counselor, he writes:  
I hope I shall not live to be wanting, according to my most humble duty, and the good 
pleasure of your Majesty’s employments: for the latter I thought it more respective to 
make choice of some oblation which might rather refer to the propriety and excellency of 
your individual person, than to the business of your crown and state (Bacon 2002, 120). 
 
Friendship, as defined in his first fruit, sheds light on the right to give counsel—even if it is 
unsolicited. He is able to give this advice in his essays to the King, not as a flatterer, but as a 
friend whom the King can take seriously. Under the guise of an essay, Bacon is able to put 
himself in the best position for acceptance from the monarch.  
 The second fruit of friendship concerns “healthful and sovereign” human understandings 
whereas the first deals with human affection (Bacon 2002, 393). Counsel is once again spoken 
about, where he mentions that human nature craves discourse and communication. To Bacon, our 
solitude is driven away by this aspect of friendship. Although he speaks of “counsel from a 
friend,” as the completing element of the second fruit, he makes the distinction between 
friendship and flattery, writing “So as there is as much difference between the council that a 
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friend giveth and that a man giveth himself, as there is between the counsel of a friend and of a 
flatterer” (Bacon 2002, 94). Therefore, Bacon speaks of choosing friends who will provide good 
council—not flattery.  However, the most relevant flatterer is a man’s self. The purpose of 
having and maintaining friendships is to “use the liberty of a friend” to counter “the flattery of a 
man’s self” (Bacon 2002, 394). Bacon’s idea here can be connected towards his actions. It is 
apparent that what Bacon is really concerned with here is the faithful counsel he can provide the 
crown, and in order to accomplish this he speaks of counsel associated with business and not 
counsel associated with manners. He writes that a friend who is acquainted with “a man’s estate 
will beware by furthering any present business, how he dasheth upon other inconvenience … rest 
not upon scattered counsels; they will rather distract nor mislead than settle and direct” (Bacon 
2002, 395). Therefore, Bacon is telling his audience including the King to not accept all 
friendships, but instead choose wisely. By doing so, Bacon indirectly forms a case for himself in 
providing friendship over flattery to the monarch. The third fruit that Bacon encompasses the 
bearing a part in all actions and occasions and expanding the human universe and experience. He 
states that the bond that one has in a true friendship carries on and “‘a friend is another [man’s 
self];’ for that a friend is far more than [a man’s self]” (Bacon 2002, 395).  Thus, the purpose for 
friendship is to have an effect on one’s life and to offer something special that no one could do 
alone. This gratification is one that Bacon hopes that the King wants and will accept in his 
essays.  
 Whereas Bacon lays out the principal reasons behind maintaining friendships, Montaigne 
lays out his understanding of what people associate friendship with as opposed to what true 
friendship really is in “Of Friendship.” Using the example of a painter, Montaigne shows that 
friendship and the art of a painter differs.  There is the first part, which a painter must choose the 
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best spot, the middle of each wall, and put a picture there that you have labored over; the second 
part is filling in the empty space around the picture with grotesques (Montaigne 1958, 135).  
Montaigne notes that such grotesques and their relation to the center, can mimic the relationship 
between oneself and the people around us. In other words, friendships are specific and we must 
be sure to differentiate them as such to understand what true friendship is.  His primary goal in 
eliminating what is construed as friendship, and what is not, is to hold each of the traditional 
understandings of friendship up to critical scrutiny and find potential mistakes in the common 
views of friendship.  Writing in essay format allows him to work through his skepticism on such 
views and to find what consists of true friendship to Montaigne, as an individual.  Pertaining to 
the first mistaken understanding of friendship, of a father and son, Montaigne holds “From 
children toward fathers it is rather respect. Friendship feeds off of communication which cannot 
exist between them because of their too great inequality” (Montaigne 1958, 136).  Similarly, 
Montaigne writes that brotherhood and friendship cannot exist as there are too many natural 
obligations in that relationship without room for free will. He mentions that friendships with 
women are impossible as they become romantic, and instances of pedophilia do not lead to 
friendship as they are purely physical (Montaigne 1958, 137-138). To Montaigne, friendship 
does not lie in these forms and “in the friendship [he] speak[s] of, our souls mingle and blend 
with each other so completely that they efface the seam that joined them, and cannot find it 
again” (Montaigne 1958, 141).   
Unlike Bacon’s propositions, the concept of benefits from a friendship are not of major 
concern to Montaigne.  He reveals the following secret about his account of friendship: “The 
secret I have sworn to reveal to no other man; I can impart without perjury to the one who is not 
another man: he is myself” (Montaigne 1958, 142).  He speaks of “doubling himself,” or, in 
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other words, Montaigne as one reads him through his essays versus who he is as an individual—
the essay and the essayer. Both Bacon and Montaigne’s perceptions of friendship are reflective 
in their styles of writing in essay form. Montaigne’s greatest friendship is with himself, and it is 
within his essays that he tries not to persuade, but to gain a deeper understanding of himself to 
better himself.  Overall, each argument for friendship furthers each author’s unique project. For 
Bacon, friendship can be viewed as a ploy to connect himself to others in the hopes of 
persuading them to adopt his position, whereas Montaigne is focused on the issue of friendship 
sole on the effect it has on the self. Together, they bolster each other when defining the 
philosophic purpose for essay writing—to persuade and to gain a deeper understanding of 
oneself. 
Bacon and Montaigne on Glory and Vain Glory 
 A similar differentiation is made amongst each author’s concern over vanity and glory in 
Bacon’s “Of Vain Glory” and Montaigne’s “Of Glory.” Bacon identifies two potential concerns 
with glory, and they have to do with glory causing faction and violence (Bacon 2002, 443-444).  
Despite these concerns, Bacon contends that glory is useful, in that “there is use of this quality in 
civil affairs. Where there is an opinion and fame to be created, either of virtue or greatness, these 
men are good trumpeters” (Bacon 2002, 444). Such civil affairs that Bacon speaks to can be 
directed to himself and his personal mission.  In this essay, it is clear that Bacon anticipates 
potential objections to his project, and his motives when writing. He speaks of military 
commanders and soldiers, and those like himself who pursue the, “Fame of learning,” (Bacon 
2002, 444) and connects this notion with an intent of advancing the political community. Vain 
glory is what one turns to in order to, “perpetuate man’s memory; and virtue was never so 
beholding to human nature, as it received his due at second hand” (Bacon 2002, 444). Critics 
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could object that what Bacon is up to is merely a project rooted in one man’s vanity, but rather 
than rejecting the idea that he is vain, he makes the argument that all great service to the city has 
its roots in vanity.  He suggests this through his example of soldiers who defend the state and 
expand its authority through conquest. Both of these and especially the latter contribute to the 
glory of the community and the crown. To the extent that Bacon is correct, he cuts off this 
potential criticism at the knees.  Further, Bacon seems to either that people will consistently act 
virtuously in power, so reassurance through glory must be given to people. Bacon implies here 
that virtue can only have its positive consequences when an outside party evaluates the actions of 
another. Thus, when the focus of evaluation is external to the self as is the case for glory, people 
will adhere to the requirements of virtue. Absent this mechanism, Bacon is not optimistic. 
 On the other hand, Montaigne begins his essay, “Of Glory,” by making a distinction 
between a concept itself and the name for such concept, in giving the example of God himself 
and the name of God. He concludes, that “it is to God alone that glory and honor belong,” and 
since human nature is “imperfect and continually in need of betterment, it is this betterment that 
we should work for” (Montaigne 1958, 468). Here, it is clear that Montaigne and Bacon differ on 
the topic of glory. To Bacon, people must be rewarded in order to be virtuous, whereas 
Montaigne believes that this glory would put people on the same level as God and heighten one’s 
vanity. The difference between Bacon and Montaigne’s concern over glory has to do with how 
they each view the act of essaying as a contributing factor to their own philosophies. This 
distinction is made clear in Montaigne’s, “Of Glory,” as he writes “Flattery poisons a prince in 
the same way that pandering corrupts “the chastity of women” (Montaigne 1958, 469). Although 
Bacon poses as a “friend,” to the monarchy as opposed to a “flatterer,” his fundamental purpose 
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in his essays is to win favor with the crown—which may have to do with why he makes an 
argument for glory.   
 In contrast to Bacon, Montaigne’s believes that glory corrupts the proper understanding 
of virtue, which is “a very vain and frivolous thing if it derives its recommendation for glory” 
(Montaigne 1958, 471).  Bacon’s suggestion on glory is embrace it and give reward to those in 
power for the good of the community. While Bacon finds such external judgments important, 
whereas Montaigne finds “external appearances [to be] marvelously uncertain and doubtful; and 
there is no witness so sure as each man to himself” (Montaigne 1958, 474).  He does recognize 
Bacon’s point about virtue and the benefits of glory, but he writes “the actions of virtue are too 
noble in themselves to seek any other reward than from their own worth, and especially to seek it 
in the vanity of human judgments” (Montaigne 1958, 477). While Bacon’s concern with glory 
pertains to the impact of those in power on the public, Montaigne is focused on the negative 
impact that glory has on oneself.  Therefore, as opposed to Bacon, Montaigne’s key to combat 
vanity is through the act of essaying. He writes that philosophy “has not been able to find a way 
to tranquility that is suitable to all” so he urges “everyone to seek it individually” through the act 
of writing an essay (Montaigne 1958, 471). As he demonstrates in his writing, the best guide one 
can have towards virtuous behavior is the guide of oneself. Through exercising one’s thought, 
privately on paper, the act of “doubling” oneself can free an individual from “the windy 
confusion of rumors, reports, and popular opinions” that glory brings about (Montaigne 1958, 
473). Thus, in Montaigne’s hands, essaying serves as a key to how individuals may combat those 
“ordinary vices” like vanity that plague the routine aspects of daily life and, more importantly, 
open the door to cruelty (see Shklar 1984). 
Bacon and Montaigne on Books and Studies 
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 Throughout each of his essays, it is clear that Bacon is trying his best to persuade the 
crown to take his advice. In Bacon’s “Of Studies,” he limits those who may offer counsel, to 
only those that are learned.  Although Bacon describes one who spends too much time on studies 
as, “sloth,” it is clear that those who are learned make “judgement wholly by their [studies] 
rules” (Bacon 2002, 339).  Studies, therefore, have the effect of being perfected by experience 
and vice versa.  For Bacon, knowledge only has value in terms of what it can generate for the 
common good of society.  His idea on studying, however, has implications for what he says 
about council in that only people who have the wisdom that Bacon speaks of can offer counsel 
appropriately. In writing this, Bacon tries to raise his own credibility to the King—which could 
have the effect of either furthering or diminishing his key ideas in, “Of Friendship,” i.e., that 
friendship is the gateway to the best council.  Unlike Montaigne, Bacon’s studies are not at all 
about cultivation of the self, rather, they are about furthering one’s agenda and success. 
Bacon lays out his purpose for reading, which he does “not to contradict and confute; nor 
to believe and take for granted; nor to find talk and discourse; but to weigh and consider” (Bacon 
2002, 439).  Here, Bacon’s purpose for reading is similar to Montaigne’s approach, linking it to 
improving one’s mind, and providing knowledge. Further, in his “Of Studies,” Bacon makes note 
of the fact that “Reading maketh a full man; conference a ready man; and writing an exact man” 
(Bacon 2002, 439). Writing, to Bacon has the effect of perfecting someone’s knowledge on a 
specific subject. In light of his position regarding aphorism in Advancement of Learning, Bacon 
contends that rhetoric is important, and more specifically, essaying is important to gain access to 
the broader knowledge an aphorism implies. To the extent that Bacon values exactness or 
precision, it is possible to view the aphorism as the most precise formulation of a much larger 
idea or concept. The similarity found here between this essay and Advancement suggests the 
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following possibility: that as one moves from developing an argument in philosophical form it is 
necessary to essay as one moves from treatise to aphorism.  Thus, the essay may also serve as a 
medium for knowledge to be transcribed correctly or more precisely. This possibility is 
important for both Bacon and Montaigne when discussing their essays on “Studies” and “Of 
Books.”   
There is a clear connection between Bacon’s ideas in “Of Studies,” and the larger 
argument made in his Advancement of Learning. Study has a threefold purpose having to do with 
delight which is associated with private and retiring, ornament which is associated with 
discourse, and ability which is connected with judgment and disposition of business (Bacon 
2002, 439). In his essay, “Of Books,” Montaigne claims that he reads “only to give [himself] 
pleasure by honest amusement; or if [he] studies, [he] seek only the learning that treats of the 
knowledge of [himself] and instructs [him] in how to die well and live well” (Montaigne 1958, 
297). Evidently, Montaigne has a very different opinion from Bacon with regards to the topic of 
study. In The Advancement of Learning, Bacon seems critical of the first two statements within 
his purposes for study, while Montaigne would find the last to breed the consequence of vanity. 
Montaigne certainly aligns with the first two statements, and to the extent of the third category, 
Montaigne and Bacon have a contrasting understanding. However, one aspect that Bacon and 
Montaigne both have in common on the topic of study and books, is that they both want, “books 
that make use of learning, not those that build it up” (Montaigne 1958, 301).  While both read 
and write with the intent to learn, they differ in how they understand “business” as it is written in 
Advancement. For Montaigne, it has to do with cultivating the best self, while Bacon wants 
books to facilitate the development of judgment that will be put to use for those great enterprises 
that make both men and nations great. 
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In “Of Books,” Montaigne states the Socratic definition of wisdom from Plato’s Apology, 
writing “Knowledge and truth can lodge in us without judgment, and judgment also without 
them; indeed, the recognition of ignorance is one of the fairest and surest testimonies of 
judgment that I find” (Montaigne 1958, 297).19  Here, lies a significant difference in Bacon and 
Montaigne’s thoughts on study and reading. Montaigne claims that skepticism, or such 
“ignorance,” is a gift and points to the problem of vanity as one who claims to possess 
knowledge when he/she does not. Following the example of Socrates, Montaigne takes the 
position that it is better to recognize the limitations of one’s knowledge. Bacon, on the other 
hand, believes that the lack of knowledge prior to his project is a consequence of knowledge’s 
improper foundation and he seeks to articulate a solution to this problem in the Advancement. By 
simply putting knowledge on his experimental foundation that focuses on experience rather than 
reason, the limits that shackle human knowledge will fall away and advancement in the way that 
we learn is possible.  Through following Montaigne’s guide toward essaying, Bacon can come to 
grasp a solution for knowledge’s proper foundation. Montaigne contends that within an essay, he 
writes in a way “by which I try to give knowledge not of things, but of myself” (Montaigne 
1958, 296).  Considering Bacon’s rhetorical and persuasive techniques, one can see that Bacon 
could use the advice of Montaigne to further his own philosophy.  
Conclusion 
 Without consciously making note of it, Bacon has a considerable amount of appreciation 
for essaying and the essay itself. Acknowledging how the public’s ideas of religion provide an 
obstacle for gaining the concrete knowledge he intends on providing, he points to rhetoric as the 
 
19 For the Socratic understanding of wisdom in The Apology see 20e-23c where Socrates 
recounts his experience with the Oracle at Delphi and his response to the Oracle by engaging 
those reputed to be wise—politicians, poets, and manual artisans.  
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gateway for people to gain a new perspective on learning. While he turns to the aphorism as 
holding value in the Advancement, he is mindful of the fact that the format he is writing in has 
the capacity to educate the public in an effective way. While he writes in the format of the essay 
to persuade the monarch, there is a reason for it being persuasive.  Essays provide those who 
read them, with short and concise information that is able to encourage the growth and expansion 
of learning that Bacon speaks of.   
When considering the view of Bacon and Montaigne, one is led to the conclusion that 
their respective positions on the philosophic purpose of the essay are informed by differing views 
on the nature and purpose of philosophy. In contrast to Bacon’s view that the essay serves as a 
rhetorical assistant to the philosopher and the philosopher’s efforts to make philosophy serve the 
public interest, Montaigne views the act of essaying as serving the private purpose of making 
oneself a better person.  As such, Bacon can be seen as operating from an inherently modern 
view of philosophy whereas Montaigne has more in common with ancient philosophy’s concern 
with the moral development of the individual.20  This difference is most evident when comparing 
their respective thoughts on glory and ceremony.  In Montaigne’s analysis, glory and ceremony 
have vanity in common. Thus, rather than offering solutions to the problem of human vanity, an 
emphasis on glory and the very nature of ceremony only serve to make this problem worse. 
When viewed in light of the argument of the previous chapter, this means that both move man 
further and further away from faith and the life that is consistent with the word of God.  All of 
 
20 My understanding of the distinction between ancient and modern philosophy is informed by 
my understanding of the thought of Leo Strauss. For a general introduction to this distinction, 
look at the Preface to the first edition of History of Political Thought (Strauss and Cropsey 
1987). The distinctions identified here are further developed in Strauss’ (1965) Natural Right 
and History. How all of this informs the political thought of an individual thinker is best 
explored by Strauss in his Thoughts on Machiavelli (1958).  
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this is a consequence of the fact that vanity serves as a primary reason for why man is no longer 
able to think properly. Montaigne’s understanding stands in opposition to that Bacon who views 
both the desire for glory and ceremony as means of advancing the good of the public. The former 
allows men like Bacon to reconsider the nature of knowledge and to make the case for radically 
changing how we think about learning, knowledge, and the purpose of both. Ceremony, in turn, 
provides those seeking to influence the direction of a nation like Bacon was the opportunity to 
advise those with access to political power. This, understanding, in turn, informs what bacon has 
to say about the nature of friendship as he uses his essay on this topic to present himself as a 
friend to the Crown. All of Bacon’s efforts can thus be understood in terms advancing his 
philosophic agenda. Montaigne, in contrast, defines friendship in terms of a “doubled” self where 
you are your own best friend.  From this, Montaigne is able show how the essay is vital to the 
project of self-cultivation.  Insulated from the intrusive eye of the public, the essay provides one 
with a safe place to admit to one’s ignorance.  Recognition of this, according to Montaigne, is a 
first step in the continued process of grappling with the meaning of one’s own experiences and 
the world more generally.  Essaying provides a way for one to exercise one’s skepticism on a 
topic he/she finds the need to scrutinize.  By doing so, the opportunity for one to seek out an 











Chapter Four: Conclusion 
 Considering the perspectives of Emerson, Montaigne, and Bacon, it is clear that each 
philosopher views the essay as serving different philosophic purposes. For Emerson, the essay is 
a tool to advance his agenda of reforming the public. Like Montaigne, Emerson focuses on moral 
development but does so by combining the private activity of reading with the public activity of 
speaking. For Bacon, the essay serves as a means of persuading others (especially elites) to instill 
a new way of learning amongst the public.  For both Emerson and Bacon, the essay can be seen 
as means of pursuing larger, social reforms with the caveat that for Emerson personal reform at 
the moral level is seen as a prerequisite for social reform (Barkalow 2014). Of the three writers 
considered here, it is in Montaigne where one finds the most philosophic purpose of the essay. 
According to Montaigne, it is through the process of essaying that individuals are presented with 
both the means and opportunity of bettering oneself. Whereas Bacon and Emerson use the act of 
essaying as a tool to persuade, Montaigne uses the act of essaying to explore the “evanescent 
self” and come to terms with the topics he is most skeptical of (Levine 2011, 251). Recognizing 
that the self is ever evolving, Montaigne views the act of essaying as a dialectic way to manage 
and ground our thinking. By doing so, one has the opportunity to accept and learn more in the 
future, instead of continuing to dwell in skepticism.  
 As one thinks about the implications of these perspectives, one can find valuable 
direction in Nussbaum (1990), who argues that literature must be brought back to the philosophic 
fold. Focusing on the novel, Nussbaum contends that literature has a direct influence on one’s 
worldview. Novels have a transportive effect, expanding the individual outside of themself in 
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order to gain insight.  This project consciously set out to extend Nussbaum’s analysis of the 
philosophic role of literature by considering a literary style, the essay, not taken up by 
Nussbaum. As to how the argument and analysis presented here accomplishes this goal, the 
answer depends on which thinker you look at.  
For Montaigne, the act of essaying turns the focus of the individual inward and focuses it 
on the self. In Nussbaum’s thought, the novel expands our horizons and brings the reader into 
contact with ideas, cultures, and times beyond the reader’s limited experience. This opens to 
attentive readers the opportunity to consider things beyond themselves. In terms of how readers 
are to do this and what readers should hope to do with this, Nussbaum provides little guidance. 
Montaigne’s essays, in contrast, offers insight into these questions. For Montaigne, the essay and 
essaying allow one to hold experience up to critical scrutiny and draw distinctions on how one 
ought to live. Essaying itself represents an exercise in skepticism and Montaigne, like Emerson, 
holds that there is a skeptical mean residing somewhere between dogma and nihilism. The ability 
to find this mean, Montaigne suggests, is a key, on the one hand, to bettering oneself, and, on the 
other hand, to live a more content life.   
Montaigne’s understanding of the philosophic purpose of the essay finds a clear 
alternative in Bacon’s understanding of the role played by the essay. As shown in Chapter Three, 
Bacon treats the essay as the auxiliary of philosophy. This is to say, that the essay serves an 
almost exclusively rhetorical function in Bacon’s thought as its purpose is to persuade others to 
buy into Bacon’s larger philosophic project laid out primarily in his The Advancement of 
Learning. At the heart of Bacon’s intellectual project is a radical reconceptualization of human 
learning and knowledge and central to this project is the objective that human learning must be 
put to use for the betterment of the human condition. Thus, whereas Montaigne seeks reform at 
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the level of the individual (Emerson does as well), Bacon’s primary concern is with large scale 
social reform.  
When thinking about what explains the differences between Montaigne and Bacon 
concerning the philosophic purpose of the essay, Chapter Three suggests that the answer may lie 
in each thinker’s respective view of the nature and purpose of philosophy. Montaigne, like many 
of the ancient writers he is fond of, takes the position that the primary purpose of philosophy 
concerns the cultivation of the human soul. It is only through a properly cultivated soul that one 
is able to lead a happy life and part of this process includes critical consideration of the sources 
of one’s happiness. The clearest example of this provided may be found in the analysis of 
religion provided in the second chapter of this thesis where Montaigne is shown as providing an 
argument for the restoration of faith as the foundation of happiness. In contrast, Bacon is well 
established as a modern philosopher; a central tenet of modern thought is faith in the capacity of 
human reason and/or science to alleviate suffering and improve the human condition. Thus, for 
Bacon, the purpose of philosophy lies external to the individual and, as such, it makes sense that 
the essay would serve a different philosophic purpose given his different understanding of the 
purpose of philosophy.  
That the relationship between the essay and philosophy is conditional finds preliminary 
support in the thought of David Hume. If given the opportunity to extend this project, a next step 
would be to consider Hume who, in his “My Own Life,” says he was “seized very early with a 
passion for literature, which has been the ruling passion of my life, and the great source of my 
enjoyments” (Hume 1987, xxxii-xxxiii). Appearing only in the second volume of his Essays 
Moral, Political, and Literary, Hume’s “On Essay-Writing” suggests a possible fusion of the 
perspective of Montaigne and Bacon. Unlike Bacon, who uses the act of essaying for rhetorical 
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and persuasive means to further his own agenda, Hume shares in common with Montaigne the 
contention that the essay serves the purpose of self-education. In his essay, Hume makes a 
distinction between the “learned and the conversable” as they apply to “the operations of the 
mind” (Hume 1987, 533). Those who are learned, “have chosen for their portion the higher and 
the more difficult operations of the mind” whereas those who are conversable “join to a sociable 
disposition, and a taste of pleasure, an inclination to the easier and more gentle exercises of the 
understanding, to obvious reflections on human affairs” (Hume 1987, 533). Hume worries about 
this distinction, calling the separation of the learned from the conversable “the great Defect of 
the last Age, and must have had a very bad Influence both on Books and Company” (Hume 
1987, 534). Hume goes further, arguing that “history, poetry, politics, and the more obvious 
principles at least of philosophy,” are not presented in the proper format (Hume 1987, 534). 
Unable and perhaps unwilling to present itself in an accessible way, the learned deny access to 
their insights to the conversable world. This lack of connection, according to Hume, results in 
learning being “a great Loser by being shut up in Colleges and Cells, and secluded from the 
World and good Company” (Hume 1987, 534). Given this line of thought, Hume would be 
critical of Montaigne for limiting philosophy to the private sphere. Limited to this sphere, any 
possibility of social benefit is removed and in taking this position Hume moves in the direction 
of Bacon. Thus, it is possible to view Hume as arguing that philosophy has both a private and 
public purpose.  
In order to realize the twofold purpose of philosophy, Hume must move away from 
Montaigne’s emphasis on the private toward Bacon. He does not go so far as the doggedly take 
the position that philosophy has the potentially to fundamentally improve the human condition, 
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however. Instead, Hume takes the position that the essay has had the effect of bridging the gap 
between the learned and conversable worlds. Hume writes: 
‘Tis with great Pleasure I observe, That Men of Letters, in this Age, have lost, in a great  
Measure, that Shyness and Bashfulness of Temper, which kept them at a Distance from 
Mankind; and, at the same Time, That Men of the World are proud of borrowing from 
Books their most agreeable Topics of Conversation. ‘Tis to be hop’d, that this League 
betwixt the learned and conversible Worlds, which is so happily begun, will be still 
farther improv’d to their mutual Advantage, and to that End, I know nothing more 
advantageous that such Essays as these with which I endeavor to entertain the Public 
(Hume 1987, 535).  
 
No longer “totally barbarous,” the learned are now able to make their learning accessible to the 
people. The conversable world, consequently, is able to improve the topics of their conversations 
by grounding them on knowledge. The synergy between the two results, according to Hume, is a 
mutual advantage that brings together Montaigne’s concern with cultivation of the self and 
Bacon’s emphasis on improving the condition of man. Thus, Hume sees himself as a 
“Ambassador from the Dominions of Learning to those of Conversation” (Hume 1987, 535). 
Here, Hume envisions his “constant Duty” in terms of promoting “a good Correspondence 
betwixt these two States, which have so great a Dependence on each other” (Hume 1987, 535).  
It is thus possible to see that Hume understands the purpose of the essay as improving 
discourse. The ability of the essay to facilitate an improved discourse points to an alternative to a 
discourse characterized by “gossiping stories and idle remarks” that results in a life that is both 
“unentertaining” and “unprofitable” (Hume 1987, 534).  Learning gives one the opportunity to 
engage in good conversation and in emphasizing conversation Hume differentiates most from 
Montaigne. For Montaigne, the act of essaying has the effect of holding things up to critical 
scrutiny or skepticism. One way to think about this is in terms of dialectic.21 This is to say, the 
 
21 The topic of dialectic is something that emerged late in this project. Going forward, it would 
be interesting to think about the essay in terms of its dialectical purpose. Here, I am using the 
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essayist uses skepticism to dialectically investigate one’s opinions and experiences with an eye 
to revealing the underlying truth. For Montaigne, this is a purely private act. In contrast, Hume’s 
emphasis on conversation has the potential to replicate the dialectical quality Montaigne 
associates with essaying. As for why Hume emphasizes the benefits of conversations informed 











term dialectical to describe a method of philosophical argument that involves some sort of 
contradictory process between opposing sides. That Montaigne’s understanding of the essay has 
an inherent connection to dialectical reasoning is suggested by both his emphasis on skepticism 
and his frequent recourse to Plato who can be thought of as offering the most classic version of 
dialectics. Going forward, one would want to consider the various ways dialectical reasoning has 
been employed in philosophy (Hegel and Marx immediately come to mind) and how essayists 
have used the various forms of dialectical reasoning in their essays.  
 
22 Hume’s emphasis on conversation is also influenced by his time spent in France where he 
became enamored with the solon culture (see Zaretsky and Scott 2010). With regard to the 
attraction of Paris and its salon culture, Hume writes that “there is a real satisfaction in living in 
Paris, from the great number of sensible, knowing, and polite company with which the city 
abounds above all places in the universe” (Hume 1987, xxxix). Understanding this helps one to 
make sense of what Hume says about “Women of Sense and Education” in his “Of Essay-
Writing” (Hume 1987, 536). There, Hume identifies these women as “the Sovereigns of the 
learned world, as well as of the conversible; and no polite writer pretends to venture upon the 
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